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FULL COURT PRESS:  
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY,  
A NEW CHALLENGE TO THE NCAA 
 
William B. Gould IV,* Glenn M. Wong,** and Eric Weitz*** 
 
In recent years, a host of issues have arisen between the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the college athletes who 
provide the labor from which the NCAA and its member universities derive 
their profits.  Many of these issues have been heavily publicized and have 
spurred a heated debate over the status of college athletes and the future of 
the collegiate athletic system.  This Article primarily focuses on the issue 
of college athletes’ status as employees for purposes of federal labor law. 
The significant increase in the popularity of college sports in recent 
years has led to conference realignment, facility building and arms race, 
governance issues and litigation.  The student-athletes, the players in the 
highly lucrative college football and basketball games have been left 
behind.  They have resorted to challenging the NCAA’s system in many 
different ways. 
Recently, football players at Northwestern University successfully 
petitioned their local Regional Director of the National Labor Relations 
Board for a union representation election, arguing that they are employees 
of the University and as such are entitled to collective bargaining rights and 
other protections under the National Labor Relations Act.  Northwestern 
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of the National Labor Relations Board, 1994-1998; Chairman of the California Agricultural 
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Matt for their research assistance in preparing this article.   
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University has rejected this argument and has appealed the Regional 
Director’s decision to the National Labor Relations Board in Washington, 
D.C.  This Article provides a background for the highly contested dispute, 
refutes some of the common arguments made against the potential 
unionization of college athletics, and discusses some of the potential 
implications if players can and do form a union. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The NCAA is currently facing historic and unprecedented 
challenges from outside parties that seek to create vast waves of change to 
the current model of intercollegiate athletics.  The issues at stake are by no 
means revolutionary, as the battle between the NCAA and student-athletes 
seeking better treatment and/or a fair share of revenues has been ongoing 
for nearly 100 years.1  But in the last five to ten years, the number of cases 
and legal basis for some of the cases are new.  Major antitrust and labor 
law litigation against the NCAA, its conferences and its institutions has 
culminated in 2014 with two major trials that aim to significantly alter the 
current NCAA model.  The O’Bannon v. NCAA case in federal court and 
the Northwestern University case before the National Labor Relations 
Board (hereinafter “the Board”) are the two cases in litigation, along with 
several other cases in the pre-trial phase that allege antitrust violations tied 
to grant-in-aid caps and cost of attendance discrepancies.2 
                                                          
1.  E.g., Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to 
Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1005-1006 (2012)  (“In 1936, in a 
story followed closely by the black and left-wing press, the Howard University football team 
struck for several games, demanding adequate medical supplies for players, nutritional food, and 
access to campus jobs.  Two years later, the Louisiana State University football team dismissed a 
player after ‘he dared to ‘agitate a union’ of the players.’  But the most high-profile disputes of 
the New Deal era centered on the University of Pittsburgh’s top-ranked football program.  After 
an undefeated 1937 season garnered the squad a Rose Bowl invitation, players demanded $200 in 
pocket money for their participation.  When university officials balked, the players voted 17-16 to 
boycott the game … The thirty-odd members of the freshman squad threatened to stike again 
several months later.  Their demands included four-year athletic scholarships, shorter working 
hours, accommodation for class time missed due to football obligations, and collective bargaining 
rights.”). 
 
2.  There are currently four major cases against the NCAA involving scholarship cap 
issues and cost of attendance discrepancies that have been consolidated with the previously-
consolidated Jenkins v. NCAA and Alston v. NCAA cases.  The four plaintiffs, listed 
chronologically from the original filing of their suit, are Kendall Gregory-McGhee (former 
football player at Minnesota & Northern Colorado), Sharrif Floyd et. al. (former football players 
at Florida), Nick Kindler (former football player at West Virginia), and Alex Lauricella (former 
football player at Tulane).  See Jon Solomon, Judge Draws NCAA Doubleheader With O’Bannon, 
Scholarship Cases, CBS SPORTS (June 17, 2014, 1:42 PM), 
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The attacked status quo is well described by The London 
Economist, paraphrasing Taylor Branch3: “[f]or decades . . . the best 
coaches earn millions of dollars while the best players live hand to 
mouth . . . for colleges to make millions from the unpaid labour of mostly 
black athletes carried ‘the whiff of the plantation.’”4 
Similarly accurate of collegiate profligate living, in our view, is the 
following New York Times commentary: 
 
The head football coach at Alabama makes $6.9 million a 
year, and his staff is also very well paid.  The offensive 
coordinator makes $680,000 a year, and the defensive 
coordinator makes $1.35 million.  The strength and 
conditioning coach earns $395,000. 
 
At Ohio State, the football team moved into a $2.5 million, 
10,000-square-foot locker room at its training complex, 
complete with a deluxe lounge outfitted with high-
definition televisions.  It also has a waterfall. 
 
When Florida State and Auburn qualified for last season’s 
Bowl Championship Series title game, their conferences 
each received $18 million. 
 
This is a portrait of life in the wealthiest districts of college 
sports. 
 
The denizens of these rarefied quarters, universities like 
Alabama and Louisiana State, are still institutions of 
higher education.  But athletics have become ever more 
central to their missions, and their bottom lines, thanks to 
                                                          
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24590912/judge-draws-ncaa-
doubleheader-with-obannon-scholarship-cases. 
 
3.  Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28 
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-
sports/308643/. 
 
4.   Players:  0; Colleges:  $10,000,000,000, THE ECONOMIST, (Aug. 16, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21612160-pressure-grows-let-student-athletes-
share-fruits-their-own-labours-players-0. 
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the juggernaut programs that generate hundreds of millions 
of dollars a year. 
 
Recruiters fly on private planes, athletes train on top-of-
the-line equipment, and teams compete in mammoth 
stadiums that are the envy of many professional teams.  It 
is not uncommon for a university’s athletic budget to 
exceed $60 million. 
 
And all of that has taken place under the N.C.A.A.’s old 
rules.5 
 
* *     *     *      * 
 
In the case of O’Bannon v. NCAA,6 lead plaintiff Ed O’Bannon 
challenged the NCAA’s use of players’ names, images and likenesses 
without providing compensation to the players.  In May 2014, O’Bannon 
and the other members of the recognized class reached a $40 million 
settlement in the case against EA Sports and Collegiate Licensing 
Company (but continued to pursue the case against the NCAA for antitrust 
claims), having alleged that the two companies used player likenesses in 
their products without providing proper compensation to the players.7  In 
June 2014, the plaintiffs in Keller v. NCAA, a related case, reached a $20 
million settlement with the NCAA over the use of player images and 
likenesses in video games.8  Recently, in August 2014, Judge Claudia 
                                                          
5.  Steve Eder, Fears Rise Over Wealth Gap as Top College Conferences Push Overhaul, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/sports/ncaafootball/new-rules-
would-further-separate-college-sports-haves-from-have-nots.html?_r=0. 
 
6.  Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW 
(N.D. Cal., Aug. 8, 2014). 
 
7.  Ed O’Bannon was a former basketball standout at UCLA, where he led the Bruins to an 
NCAA Championship in 1995.  O’Bannon opted to take legal action against the NCAA, EA 
Sports, and the Collegiate Licensing Company after discovering that his likeness was used in an 
earlier iteration of an EA Sports College Basketball game.  E.g., Steve Eder & Ben Strauss, 
Understanding Ed O’Bannon’s Suit Against the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-ed-obannons-suit-
against-the-ncaa.html?_r=0.  
 
8.  Associated Press, NCAA settles with former athletes, ESPN (June 9, 2014, 5:12 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11055977/ncaa-reaches-20m-settlement-video-game-
claims.  
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Wilken decided the O’Bannon antitrust claims and held that the NCAA 
player compensation prohibition was an unreasonable restraint of trade 
within the meaning of the Sherman Antitrust Act, specifically noting “the 
association’s rules prohibiting student-athletes from receiving any 
compensation for the use of the names, images, and likenesses restrains 
price competition among FBS football and Division I basketball 
schools . . . .”9 
Since the filing of the O’Bannon case, several other antitrust cases 
have been brought against the NCAA stemming from issues with grant-in-
aid caps and cost-of-attendance discrepancies.  Under the current system, 
an institution’s grant-in-aid package only includes tuition, 
college/university fees, books, and room and board – all of which are 
defined by the NCAA as necessary “grant-in-aid” costs.  However, it has 
been estimated that the average athletic scholarship still falls several 
thousand dollars below the actual cost of attendance.  This is referred to as 
the ‘cost of attendance gap’ in several of the lawsuits brought against the 
NCAA.10  In August 2014, the NCAA, reflecting what has been called 
“Team Reform,”11  allowed the so-called “Power Five”12 Conferences to 
“ . . . pay their athletes a few thousand dollars more than what the current 
scholarship rules allow, loosen restrictions against agents and advisors, and 
revamp recruiting rules to ease contact with top prospects.”13  The retreat 
appears to be on, in an attempt to stave off “Team Market,”14  i.e., the raw 
                                                          
9.  O’Bannon, No. C-09-3329-CW at 94; O’Bannon, No. C-09-3329-CW at 80, 87-88, 89 
(Judge Claudia Wilken rejected the NCAA’s argument that the challenged restrictions on student-
athlete compensation are reasonable because 1) they are necessary to preserve the tradition of 
amateurism, 2) maintain the competitive balance in FBS football and Division I basketball teams, 
3) promote the integration of academics and athletics, and 4) increase the total output of its 
product). 
 
10.  Tribune Graphics, INFOGRAPHIC: When a Full-Ride Isn’t, CHI. TRIB. (June 24, 
2014, 6:44 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-infographic-when-a-fullride-isnt-
20140624-htmlstory.html. 
 
11.  Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., This is Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/opinion/sunday/joe-nocera-the-ncaas-feeble-reform-
impulse.html. 
 
12.  See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
 
13.  Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A. May Let Top Conferences Play by Own Rules, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/sports/n-c-a-a-s-rich-poised-to-get-richer-
with-more-athlete-benefits-.html. 
 
14.  Nocera, supra note 11.  
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commercialization of college sports in a manner akin to their professional 
counterparts. 
Two notable cases are Jenkins v. NCAA, in which the plaintiff 
argues that the NCAA’s scholarship cap violates antitrust law by instituting 
an illegal payment cap in an otherwise free market,15 and Alston v. NCAA 
et. al., , in which the plaintiff alleges that the NCAA and its Power Five 
Conferences (ACC, Big Ten, Big 12, PAC-12 and SEC) colluded to cap the 
amount of scholarship money granted to student-athletes at a value below 
the actual cost of attendance.16  These antitrust challenges brought against 
the NCAA, in addition to the O’Bannon case and Northwestern University, 
have shaken the legal ground defining amateurism and the NCAA model, a 
trend fueled by colleges awash in money as they engage in a competitive 
arms race for athletic talent.  Both are cases of first impression and 
groundbreaking in their respective challenges to the NCAA model, so it is 
difficult to use precedent in determining a set of likely outcomes.17 
The name, image and likeness and grant-in-aid cases seek to alter 
the current NCAA model through litigation.  However, members of the 
Northwestern University football team took a different approach in January 
2014 when they filed a petition to the regional office of the National Labor 
Relations Board in Chicago asking the Board to allow members of the team 
to be represented by a union.18  As explained by Ramogi Huma, a former 
UCLA football player and president of the National College Players 
Association,19 “[t]his is about finally giving college athletes a seat at the 
                                                          
15.  See Andy Staples, O’Bannon Just the Beginning: Jenkins case could unhinge NCAA, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 19, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-football/2014/06/18/obannon-
vs-ncaa-jenkins-mark-emmert-claudia-wilken.  
 
16.  See Lawsuit Alleges NCAA and Conferences Cap Scholarships Illegally, 
INSIDEHIGHERED.COM (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2014/03/07/lawsuit-alleges-ncaa-and-conferences-
cap-scholarships-illegally#sthash.tOYjbuOn.dpbs. 
 
17.  Contra Ronald Katz, Right Or Wrong, Precedent Will Decide O’Bannon Case In 
Favor Of NCAA, FORBES (July 21, 2014, 8:55 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/07/21/right-or-wrong-precedent-will-decide-
obannon-case-in-favor-of-ncaa/. 
 
18.  See Teddy Greenstein, Northwestern Football Players Seek to Join Labor Union, CHI. 
TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2014) http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-01-28/sports/chi-northwestern-
football-players-labor-union-20140128_1_basketball-players-labor-union-national-labor-
relations-board. 
 
19.  “The National College Players Association (NCPA) is a 501c3 nonprofit advocacy 
group launched by UCLA football players that serves as the only independent voice for college 
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table . . . [a]thletes deserve an equal voice when it comes to their physical, 
academic and financial protections.”20 
This article focuses on one of these major challenges, 
Northwestern University, and the attempt to unionize student-athletes.  The 
first part of the article discusses the NCAA college athletics economic 
model, since a significant portion of its revenues is based on the current 
model.  It is important to understand the challenge and then also to 
understand the implications to finances and to college athletics if the 
plaintiffs are successful in litigation and/or the NCAA settles any of these 
cases with significant changes to its current model. 
The second part of this article focuses on the Northwestern 
University case.  The third section of this article deals with financial and 
other implications if the petitioners in Northwestern University are 
successful.  Finally, the fourth section of this article discusses some 
possible outcomes if the current NCAA model is significantly changed, 
either through litigation and/or the settlement of litigation, either from 
Northwestern University, O’Bannon v. NCAA, Jenkins v. NCAA, Alston v. 
NCAA, or any of the antitrust cases. 
 
II. NCAA DIVISION I REVENUES AND EXPENSES 
A. Introduction 
Division I is the highest level of intercollegiate athletics sanctioned 
by the NCAA.  The NCAA is divided into three separate divisions of 
athletic competition−Division I, Division II, and Division III.21  Division I 
schools generally have the largest student bodies, manage the largest 
athletic budgets, and grant the most athletic scholarships.22 
                                                          
athletes across the nation.”  About NCPA, NAT’L COLLEGE PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://www.ncpanow.org/about (last visited Aug. 23, 2014).  The mission of the NCPA is “[t]o 
provide the means for college athletes to voice their concerns and change NCAA rules.”  The 
NCPA has outlined 11 goals ranging from rule changes to governance reform that are designed to 
improve the well-being of NCAA student-athletes.  Mission & Goals, NAT’L COLLEGE PLAYERS 
ASS’N, http://www.ncpanow.org/about/mission-goals (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
 
20.  Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN (Jan. 28, 2014, 9:08 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestern-wildcats-football-
players-trying-join-labor-union. 
 
21.  Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
 
22.  Division I: About the Division, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last 
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The money in college athletics is generated by the governing body, 
the NCAA, college conferences, and individual schools.  This section will 
provide an overview of the finances of college sports.  The first part will 
focus on the NCAA, the second part on college conferences, and the third 
part on colleges and universities. 
 
“The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA or 
the “Association”) is an unincorporated not-for-profit 
educational organization founded in 1906.  The NCAA is 
the organization through which colleges and universities of 
the nation speak and act on athletic matters at the national 
level.  It is a voluntary association of more than 1,200 
institutions, conferences, and organizations devoted to the 
sound administration of intercollegiate athletics in all its 
phases.  Through the NCAA, its members consider any 
athletics issue that crosses regional or conference lines and 
is national in character.  The NCAA strives for integrity in 
intercollegiate athletics and serves as the colleges’ national 
athletics governing agency.  A basic purpose of the NCAA 
is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of 
the educational program and the athlete as an integral part 
of the student body.”23 
B. NCAA Finances 
From a financial perspective, the NCAA revenues are significant, 
totaling over $900 million in 2012-13 as shown in Figure 1 below, with 
revenues coming primarily from television and marketing rights related to 
the NCAA men’s basketball tournament. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
 
23.  NCAA, NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND SUBSIDIARIES: 
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF THE YEARS ENDED AUGUST 31, 2013 AND 2012, 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION AS OF AND FOR THE YEAR ENDED AUGUST 31, 2013, AND 
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/NCAA_FS_2012-13_V1%20DOC1006715.pdf 
[hereinafter NCAA 2013 Financial Statements]. 
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Television and 
marketing rights 
fees 
 
$726,391,860.00  
80% 
Championships 
and NIT 
tournaments 
$110,631,867.00  
12% 
Investment 
income -- net  
$41,398,750.00  
4% 
Sales and 
services 
 $27,307,562.00  
3% 
Contributions -- 
facilities -- net 
 $7,074,007.00  
1% 
Figure 1 
2012-13 NCAA Revenues24 
 
Revenues 2013 Total 
Television and marketing rights fees  $726,391,860.00  
Championships and NIT tournaments  $110,631,867.00  
Investment income—net   $41,398,750.00  
Sales and services  $27,307,562.00  
Contributions—facilities—net  $7,074,007.00  
  
Total revenues  $912,804,046.00  
 
 
Figure 2 
2012-13 NCAA Percentage of Revenue by Category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An examination of NCAA expenses (or distributions) by division 
illustrates that the vast majority of NCAA expenses are directed towards 
                                                          
24.  Id. at 4. 
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Division I conferences and institutions.  Not including association-wide 
programs or management and general expenses, 91% of division-specific 
NCAA expenses are spent in Division I.25  77% of the NCAA’s division-
specific expenses is distributed to Division I institutions, while an 
additional 14% is used to fund Division I championships, programs and 
NIT tournaments.26  5% of the NCAA’s division-specific expenses is used 
to fund Division II championships, distributions, and programs, while 4% 
is allocated to Division III championships and programs.27 
 
Figure 3 
2012-13 NCAA Expenses28 
 
Expenses 2013 Total 
Distribution to Division I members  $527,432,377.00  
Division I championships, programs, & NIT tournaments  $97,407,498.00  
Division II championships, distribution, and programs  $35,650,808.00  
Division III championships and programs  $27,531,406.00  
Association-wide programs  $122,244,138.00  
Management and general  $41,875,827.00  
  
Total expenses  $852,142,054.00  
 
A significant percentage of the money goes to Division I 
universities. Most of the money is distributed to conferences, with some of 
the money going directly to institutions.29  The monies are distributed 
according to various formulas within each category, and are distributed in a 
combination of across-the-board directed grants and earned money.30 
                                                          
25.  Id. 
 
26.  Id. 
 
27.  Id. 
 
28.  Id. 
 
29.  NCAA 2013 Financial Statements, supra note 23, at 4. 
 
30.  Id. at 9. 
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The remaining non-division-specific NCAA expenses include 
$122,244,138 (14% of total expenses) for association-wide programs and 
$41,875,827 (5% of total expenses) for management and general 
expenses.31 
The NCAA also maintains a reserve fund to guard and protect the 
future interests of its membership. In 2013 the NCAA reported a $92.5 
million operating reserve in addition to a $326 million quasi-endowment 
reserve.32  The quasi-endowment exists specifically to “protect NCAA 
membership in the event that media revenue dollars are not received due to 
an interruption in the men’s basketball championship.”33  In all, the NCAA 
claimed over $589 million in unrestricted net assets during the 2013 fiscal 
year.34 
As noted above, 77% of NCAA expenses are directed to Division I 
membership distributions. While revenues are generally distributed to 
conferences, the mechanism for distribution to individual institutions varies 
across conferences depending on specific bylaws.35 
It is important to note that the revenue distribution to Division I 
institutions does not occur on a pro-rata basis.  A large portion of revenue 
distribution is based on success in the men’s basketball championship.36  
This generally means that the Power Five conferences receive greater 
revenue distributions than smaller conferences based on their relative 
success in the tournament.37  The Power Five conferences received 
between $14.5 and $28.7 million from the NCAA basketball fund in 2012-
13, while the distributions to other conferences ranged from $1.4 to $8.1 
million.38  The Atlantic-10 (A-10) Conference and the Metro Atlantic 
                                                          
31.  Id. at 4. 
 
32.  Id. at 19. 
 
33.  The NCAA: Where the Money Goes, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-
safety/ncaa-budget-where-money-goes (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
 
34.  NCAA 2013 Financial Statements, supra note 23, at 19. 
 
35.  The NCAA: Where the Money Goes, supra note 33; NCAA 2013 Financial Statements, 
supra note 23, at 7. 
 
36.  The NCAA: Where the Money Goes, supra note 33. 
 
37.  NCAA, 2012-2013 DIVISION I REVENUE DISTRIBUTION PLAN 7 (2012), available at 
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2012-13_Revenue_Distribution_Plan.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 23 2014) [hereinafter 2012-13 Plan]. 
 
38.  NCAA, 2013-2014 DIVISION I REVENUE DISTRIBUTION PLAN 9 (2013), available at 
FULL COURT PRESS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2015  1:53 PM 
12 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
Athletic Conference (MAAC) are two of the non-Power Five conferences.  
In 2012-13 the A-10 received $8,101,952 from the NCAA basketball fund, 
while the MAAC received $2,209,623.39  It should also be noted that these 
revenue distribution figures do not include payouts from college football. 
C. Conference Finances 
There are currently 31 NCAA Division I conferences.40  While the 
historical focus of conferences was to create competition, there was also an 
academic component to their formation.  As stated by the SEC on its 
website, “[t]he purpose of the Southeastern Conference is to assist its 
member institutions in the maintenance of programs of intercollegiate 
athletics which are compatible with the highest standards of education and 
competitive sports.”41  However, over the years the role of conferences has 
shifted to where conferences have become more powerful, perhaps more 
powerful than the NCAA itself. 
As the previous section on NCAA finances shows, a large portion 
of NCAA revenues are distributed to Division I institutions, with the 
majority of that money flowing to the Power Five conferences.42  However, 
this “basketball” money is not the only money on the revenue side of 
conferences’ financial statements.  With regard to the SEC’s most recent 
financial statements, “[t]he total amount of the distribution is composed of 
revenue generated from televised football, bowl games, the SEC football 
championship, televised basketball, the SEC men’s basketball tournament, 
NCAA championships and a supplemental surplus distribution.”43 
The financial statements of NCAA Division I conferences are 
generally not publicly available.  The information in the following section 
                                                          
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2013-14%20Revenue%20Distribution%20Plan.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2014) [hereinafter 2013-14 Plan]. 
 
39.  Id. at 9. 
 
40.  NCAA Members by Division, NCAA, 
http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec2/divisionListing (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
 
41.  About the SEC, THE SOUTHEASTERN CONFERENCE (Aug. 9, 2014), 
http://secsports.go.com/article/11067695/about-the-sec-conference. 
 
42.  2012-13 Plan, supra note 37, at 9. 
 
43.  Edward Aschoff, SEC distributes record $292.8M, ESPN (May 30, 2014, 4:24 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/11007094/sec-distributes-record-2928-million-
revenue. 
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was compiled from national media reports, not from the actual financial 
statements.  There is even less information available for the mid-major 
Division I conferences. 
As noted in the 2013-2014 NCAA Revenue Distribution Plan, the 
SEC received over $15.2 million in distributions from the NCAA 
basketball fund in 2012-13.44  As the SEC reported $314.5 million in 
overall revenue for the 2012-13 academic year45 (a 15% increase from the 
previous year), nearly $300 million in SEC revenue was derived from 
sources outside NCAA men’s basketball fund distributions.46 
The SEC derives a large portion of its revenues from television 
broadcasting contracts.47  A contract with CBS for the broadcast rights to 
its top game each week and conference championship game nets the SEC a 
reported $55 million per year.48  In 2013, the conference also announced 
the launch of the SEC Network, a co-venture with ESPN49 that extended a 
$2.25 billion, 15-year deal ($150 million per year, annualized) struck with 
the network in 2008.50 
In May 2014, the SEC announced a record-distribution of $292.8 
million, with each institution set to receive roughly $20.9 million.51  This 
figure represents over 90% of the SEC’s total revenues, and does not 
include bowl game payouts ($16.8 million per participant) and NCAA 
                                                          
44.  2013-14 Plan, supra note 38, at 9. 
 
45.  Steve Berkowitz, Pac-12 zooms past Big Ten, SEC in college sports revenue, USA 
TODAY (May 23, 2014, 8:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/05/23/pac-
12-conference-tax-return-revenue-record/9497233/. 
 
46.  2013-14 Plan, supra note 38, at 9. 
 
47.  See generally Jeremy Fowler, SEC, CBS Rework Long-Term Contract, CBS SPORTS 
(May 14, 2013, 4:25 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jeremy-
fowler/22244033/sec-cbs-rework-long-term-contract. 
 
48.  Id. 
 
49.  SEC Network to broadcast 24/7, ESPN (May 2, 2013, 4:11 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/story/_/id/9235260/sec-espn-announce-sec-network-2014. 
 
50.  Richard Sandomir, SEC Will Start TV Network in 2014, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/03/sports/ncaafootball/sec-will-have-own-tv-network-starting-
in-2014.html?_r=0. 
 
51.  Aschoff, supra note 43. 
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academic enhancement funding ($1 million pool) directed to individual 
institutions.52 
Other Power Five conferences employ different television rights 
models. In 2007, the Big 10 launched the Big 10 Network, a 20-year co-
venture with Fox53 that helped increase revenues to $318.4 million in 2012-
13.54  The Big 10 Network holds rights to most games and contests that are 
not picked up by its primary rights holders, which are ESPN, CBS for 
basketball, and FOX for the football conference championship game.55  
Broadcast rights revenues are shared equally by Big 10 schools, with the 
exception of new member institutions, which must wait six years before 
receiving a full share of the revenues.56 
In May 2014, the Big 12 announced a record distribution of $220 
million in revenue to member institutions.57  Similar to the Big 10, member 
institutions share the distribution equally, except for new members, which 
receive partial shares during the first years.58  However, the broadcast 
rights model is slightly different than those of the SEC and Big 10.59  In the 
Big 12, primary broadcast rights are held by ESPN, with Fox owning 
secondary rights.60  The tertiary broadcast rights are retained by each 
                                                          
52.  Id. 
 
53.  Jeff Smith, Big Ten Network Celebrates Anniversary of Launch, BIG TEN (Aug. 29, 
2008), http://www.bigten.org/genrel/082908aal.html. 
 
54.  Berkowitz, supra note 45. 
 
55.  Kristi Dosh, College TV Rights Deals Undergo Makeovers, ESPN (May 10, 2012, 
12:56 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/playbook/dollars/post/_/id/705/college-tv-rights-deals-
undergo-makeovers. 
 
56.  Tom Fornelli, Big Ten School Projected to Make $45 Million with New TV Deal, CBS 
SPORTS (Apr. 26, 2014, 10:52 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-
football/24540002/big-ten-schools-projected-to-get-45-million-with-new-tv-deal. 
 
57.  Chuck Carlton, Big 12 to Distribute Conference-Record $220 Million to Member 
Schools, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (May 31, 2014, 12:05 AM), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/college-sports/headlines/20140531-big-12-to-distribute-
conference-record-220-million-to-member-schools.ece. 
 
58.  Blair Kerkhoff, Record Big 12, SEC Conference Revenue Expected to Keep Climbing, 
KANSAS CITY STAR (May 31, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/sports/spt-columns-
blogs/campus-corner/article320277/Record-Big-12-SEC-conference-revenue-expected-to-keep-
climbing.html. 
 
59.  See Dosh, supra note 55. 
 
60.  Id. 
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institution, which allows each school to monetize those rights as the market 
allows.61  In 2011 the University of Texas launched the Longhorn Network, 
a co-venture with ESPN62 that has allowed the athletic department to 
receive around $15 million annually in exchange for the third-tier rights to 
its games.63 
A look at some of the available information for mid-major 
conferences shows that the revenues are significantly less than the Power 
Five conferences.  For example, in 2013 the Mid-American Conference 
received $15.7 million from participating in college football bowls, but 
$12.9 million of that money came from Northern Illinois’ participation in a 
BCS bowl,64 which is an uncommon opportunity for a non-Power Five 
conference institution.  By comparison, the SEC earned over $52 million 
from bowl game payouts in 2013.65 
D. Revenues Related to FBS Athletic Departments 
Division I is subdivided based on football sponsorship.66  The 
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS), formerly known as Division I-A, is 
collection of 123 NCAA Division I schools67 with premier varsity football 
programs that participate in post-season bowl games and play at least 60% 
of their regular season football games against other FBS institutions.68 
                                                          
61.  Kerkhoff, supra note 58. 
 
62.  Natalie England, Longhorn Network Launches from UT’s South Mall,  
TEXASSPORTS.COM (Aug. 27, 2011), 
http://www.texassports.com/news/2011/8/27/082711aaa_91.aspx. 
 
63.  Kerkhoff, supra note 58. 
 
64.  Jon Solomon, NCAA Audit: Every Football Conference Made Money on 2012-2013 
Bowls, AL.COM (Dec. 11, 2013, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/12/bowl_money_101_ncaa_audit_show.html. 
 
65.  Id. 
 
66.  Division I: About the Division, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about?division=d1 (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
  
67.  NCAA Sports Sponsorship: Football Bowl Subdivision, NCAA, 
http://web1.ncaa.org/onlineDir/exec2/sponsorship?sortOrder=0&division=1A&sport=MFB (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
 
68.  Division I: About the Division, supra note 66; 2013-2014 NCAA Division I Manual 
art. 20.9.9.2.  The Football Championship Subdivision (FCS), formally known as Division I-AA, 
is the other major Division I subdivision.  The FCS consists of schools that participate in a 
NCAA-run football championship.  Additionally, Division I is comprised of a third group that 
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Total revenue reported in an athletic program’s budget consists of 
both allocated and generated revenues.69  Allocated revenue includes direct 
and indirect support from the university, student’s fees, and government 
subsidies.70  Generated revenue consists of dollars generated directly by the 
athletic department, such as ticket sales, royalties, broadcast rights, and 
alumni contributions.71  Accordingly, athletic expenditures are reported by 
breaking down operating expenses line by line to illustrate where the 
money is being spent. 
Net revenues (total revenues in excess of total expenses) are a 
measure of financial health and strength to the extent that total revenues 
cover total expenses.  Additionally, net generated revenues (total generated 
revenues in excess of total expenses) also measure financial health, but 
more importantly they may indicate self-sufficiency.72  Positive net 
generated revenues imply an athletic department can fund itself with 
revenue sources independent of institutional entities outside of the 
department.  In 2013, FBS athletic programs generated median revenues of 
$41,897,000, independent of allocated sources.73  The largest percentage of 
these revenues were derived from ticket sales (26 percent), contributions 
from alumni and others (25 percent), and distributions from the NCAA and 
each institutions’ respective conference (24 percent).74  See Figure 4 below 
for an illustration of where generated revenues are derived from. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
does not belong to a subdivision, as those schools do not sponsor intercollegiate football 
programs.  Division I: About the Division, supra note 66. 
 
69.  See generally id. 
 
70.  Id. at 9. 
 
71.  Id. at 9. 
 
72.  Daniel L. Fulks, Revenues and Expenses:  NCAA Division I Intercollegiate Athletics 
Programs Report 2004-2013, NCAA 11, 107 (Apr. 2014), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1REVEXP2013.pdf. 
 
73.  Id. at 12. 
 
74.  Id. at 13. 
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Figure 475 
NCAA FBS Total Generated Revenue Distributions 
Mean Values (2013) 
 
 
E. Expenses Related to FBS Athletic Departments 
Despite an influx of substantial generated revenues, athletics 
programs are expensive to run.  The median of total expenses for FBS 
athletics departments in 2013 was $62,227,000,76 and total expenses 
exceeded generated revenues by $11,623,000.77  Furthermore, the largest 
athletic expenditures, comprising fifty percent of the median expense 
budget, are compensation and grants-in-aid to student athletes.78  Other 
large expenditures absorbed by athletics programs include direct facilities 
costs, such as building and grounds maintenance, and costs related to team 
                                                          
75.  Percentage values are derived from the mean values, rather than medians.  Id. at 41. 
 
76.  Id. at 33. 
 
77.  Id. at 20. 
 
78.  Fulks, supra note 72, at 13. 
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travel and game day expenses.  Most athletic departments do not generate 
enough revenue to cover athletics expenses.  In 2013, a total of 103 FBS 
athletics programs reported negative net generated revenues (expenses 
exceeded generated revenue).79  Only 20 programs reported positive net 
generated revenues (generated revenue exceeded expenses);80 however, 
there was a $23,000,000 gap between profitable programs and others, 
illustrating the larger variation between athletic budgets in the FBS.81  
Figure 5 illustrates the breakdown of expenses incurred by FBS athletics 
programs and where athletic departments generate revenues to fund such 
expenses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
79.  Id. at 28. 
 
80.  Id. 
 
81.  Id. at 13. 
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Figure 582 
NCAA FBS Expense Distributions  
(Percentage of Total Operating Expenses)  
Mean Values 2013 
 
 
F.  FBS – The Power Five Conferences 
The financials vary considerably in the FBS division.  There are 65 
schools in the Power Five conferences.83  Here are some of the selected 
schools in the top part of the FBS: 
                                                          
82.  Percentage values are derived from the mean values, rather than medians.  Id. at 41-
42. 
 
83.  See Dennis Dodd, NCAA Proposal Would Put Power in Hands of BCS Conferences, 
CBS SPORTS (Jan. 10, 2014, 12:42 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/dennis-
dodd/24404728/ncaa-proposal-would-put-power-in-hands-of-bcs-conferences. 
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Figure 684 
2013 Revenues and Expenses   
Selected Power Five Conference Institutions85 
 
Revenues Texas Alabama Michigan Ohio State 
Ticket sales $60,860,735 $38,904,537 $43,135,543 $54,598,907 
Contributions $37,386,271 $34,233,035 $31,285,461 $22,204,606 
Rights/licensing $58,771,963 $46,032,919 $53,950,086 $45,768,835 
Other $8,672,517 $18,814,859 $14,887,203 $17,066,959 
Student fees $0 $0 $0 $0 
School funds $0 $5,791,200 $255,832 $0 
Total Revenue $165,691,486 $143,776,550 $143,514,125 $139,639,307 
     
Expenses     
Coaching/staff $55,238,796 $42,215,904 $44,711,328 $52,892,103 
Scholarships $9,956,345 $13,281,263 $18,301,214 $15,537,209 
Buildings/grounds $25,125,236 $22,032,122 $28,972,772 $6,359,999 
Other $56,487,208 $39,535,097 $39,032,997 $41,448,018 
Total Expenses $146,807,585 $116,607,913 $131,018,311 $116,026,329 
     
Total Subsidy $0 $5,791,200 $255,832 $0 
Subsidy Percent 0 4.03 0.18 0 
 
Strong revenues and profitability are the hallmarks of these four 
selected Power Five institutions.  These four institutions earn some of the 
highest revenues in Division I.86  It is also important to note that revenues 
surpass expenses for each of the four athletic departments.  By comparison, 
the median revenue for Division I athletic departments is just under $21 
million.87 
                                                          
84.  NCAA Finances, USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/schools/finances/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
 
85.  For methodology, see Methodology for NCAA Athletic Department Revenue 
Database, USA TODAY (June 4, 2014, 4:52 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/10/college-athletic-department-revenue-
database-methodology/2150123/ [hereinafter Methodology]. 
 
86.  NCAA Finances, supra note 84. 
 
87.  Id. 
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G.  FBS – Mid-Majors and Below 
“Mid-majors” is a term more closely associated with NCAA 
basketball.  However, it may be an appropriate description of many of the 
programs outside the Power Five conferences.  The contrast is stark and 
significant when comparing the athletic departments at the University of 
East Carolina (American Athletic Conference), the University of Ohio 
(Mid-American Conference) and Troy University (Sun Belt Conference). 
 
Figure 7 
2013 Revenues and Expenses   
Selected Mid-Major Conference Institutions88 
 
Revenues East Carolina Ohio Troy 
Ticket sales $6,859,822 $1,215,671 $622,661 
Contributions $5,744,975 $2,204,293 $2,956,672 
Rights/licensing $6,587,254 $4,146,155 $1,391,685 
Student fees $12,368,781 $15,724,403 $956,988 
School funds $2,600,735 $2,336,950 $11,900,270 
Other $1,643,665 $1,637,589 $1,667,447 
Total Revenue $35,805,232 $27,265,061 $19,505,723 
    
Expenses    
Coaching/staff $14,941,576 $7,894,851 $5,581,247 
Scholarships $6,931,230 $7,068,691 $4,855,126 
Buildings/grounds $1,911,496 $1,966,678 $3,042,532 
Other $12,855,192 $10,097,330 $6,026,818 
Total Expenses $36,639,494 $27,027,550 $19,505,723 
    
Total Subsidy $14,969,516 $18,061,353 $12,857,258 
Subsidy Percent 41.81 66.24 65.92 
 
The revenues of the Power Five conference schools are on the 
magnitude of five times greater than the revenues of these mid-major 
institutions.  The differences are especially significant with regard to ticket 
sales89 and rights and licensing.90  The University of Texas athletic 
                                                          
88.  Id. 
 
89.  See Methodology, supra note 85 (the USA Today database defines each category by 
using the definition the NCAA provides to its member institution in reporting instructions, for 
those definitions, see http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/EADA/2013AgreedUponProcedures.pdf.  The 
NCAA defines a number of categories, but the USA Today database combines some of those 
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department, for example, earns nearly 100 times the annual ticket revenue 
of the Troy University athletic department.91 
Another important aspect is the amount of the institutional 
subsidy92 received by each athletic department.  The subsidies to the 
selected Power Five programs range from 0 to 4.03%.93 For the selected 
mid-major institutions, institutional subsidies are much higher, between 
41.81 and 66.24%.94  At 66.24%, the institutional subsidy at Ohio 
University is just below the median figure for institutions for which data 
was available (66.3%).95  The two figures also illustrate that while none of 
the four selected Power Five athletic departments receive money from 
student fees, all three mid-major athletic departments receive considerable 
funding from student fees.96 
One of the most striking differences between the two groups on the 
expense side of the equation is the amount of coach and staff salaries.97  
While the percentage of the department’s budget devoted to coach and staff 
                                                          
categories (i.e., Broadcast Television, Radio and Internet Rights and Royalties, Licensing 
Advertisements and Sponsorships are combined into the single category, “Rights/Licensing.”).  
Ticket sales are defined as:  “Sales of admissions to athletics events. Include ticket sales to the 
public, faculty and students, and money received for shipping and handling of tickets. Does not 
include amounts in excess of face value (such as preferential seating) or sales for conference and 
national tournaments that are pass-through transactions.”). 
 
90.  Id. (“Rights/Licensing:  Includes revenue for athletics from radio and television 
broadcasts, Internet and ecommerce rights received from institution-negotiated contracts, the 
NCAA and conference revenue sharing arrangements; and revenue from corporate sponsorships, 
licensing, sales of advertisements, trademarks and royalties. Includes the value of in-kind 
products and services provided as part of the sponsorship (e.g., equipment, apparel, soft drinks, 
water and isotonic products).”). 
 
91.  NCAA Finances, supra note 84. 
 
92.  See Methodology, supra note 85 (“Total Subsidy: The sum of students fees, direct and 
indirect institutional support and state money. The NCAA and others consider such funds 
"allocated" or everything not generated by the department's athletics functions.”). 
 
93.   NCAA Finances, supra note 84. 
  
94.  Id. 
  
95.  Id. 
 
96.  Id. 
 
97.  Erik Brady & Jodi Upton, Mid-Majors Squeezed to Pay Up, USA TODAY (Mar. 8, 
2007, 2:00 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2007-03-07-mid-
major-coach-salary_N.htm; Methodology, supra note 85 (“Coaching/staff: All salaries, bonuses 
and benefits reported on the university's tax forms for coaches and staff, as well as third-party 
contributions.”). 
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salaries is not dramatically different between the two sets of institutions, 
the absolute amount of coach and staff compensation is much lower at the 
mid-major institutions.98  This is emblematic of a system that rewards 
successful mid-major coaches and staff members with lucrative 
opportunities at higher levels of college athletics.99  In many cases, the 
mid-major institutions find it difficult to compete with the salaries and 
prestige offered by many Power Five institutions.100  In the end, mid-major 
institutions have trouble meeting many financial challenges brought on by 
the lack of revenue-generating programs that help to subsidize other 
sports.101 
H.  Revenue Growth Over the Last Seven Years 
There has been significant revenue growth in Division I athletics over 
the past seven years, especially at the top of FBS football.102 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
98.  Id. 
 
99.  Id. 
 
100.  Id. 
 
101.  Id. 
 
102.  NCAA Finances, supra note 84. 
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Figure 8103 
Revenue Growth for Selected FBS Institutions (2006 – 2013) 
 
 
 
Alabama and Wisconsin, two Power Five conference institutions 
have enjoyed very strong revenue growth since 2006.104  In just seven 
years, Wisconsin increased its revenues by over 89%.  Alabama posted a 
112% increase in revenue during the same period.105  The chart also shows 
the revenue growth of the athletic department at Ohio University.106  While 
Ohio totaled just over $27 million in revenue in 2013, the athletic 
department posted revenue growth of 66% between 2006 and 2013.107 
Despite the strong revenue growth shown by the Ohio athletic 
department, the fact remains that the gap between mid-major institutions 
                                                          
103.  Id. 
 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  Id. 
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and Power Five institutions is widening.108  This growing disparity is likely 
to continue and even increase, as the Power Five conferences negotiate (or 
renegotiate) their conference football and men’s basketball media contracts, 
and/or realize the growth of revenues from regional networks and the 
acquisition of new and larger markets.  The addition of Maryland and 
Rutgers to the Big 10 is one such example of a conference substantially 
increasing its television footprint in search of increased broadcast 
revenues.109  Additionally, the introduction of the College Football Playoff 
will result in a new football bowl payout structure, likely one that directs 
more resources towards the Power Five conferences.110 
 
III. NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 
A. Introduction 
In 2014, the Chicago Regional Director of the National Labor 
Relations Board held that Northwestern University football players were 
employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”).111  This decision, which may not be resolved on appeal for a 
number of years,112 has created an enormous number of attacks, coming in 
the press113 as well as from Congress,114 which has responded with a 
                                                          
108.  NCAA Finances, supra note 84. 
109.  Ben Straus, The Big Ten’s Bigger Footprint, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/business/the-big-tens-bigger-
footprint.html?pagewanted=all&r=0. 
 
110.  Brett McMurphy, Power Conferences Likely to Receive Most of Playoff Revenue, 
CBS SPORTS (June 18, 2012, 7:57 PM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/19378895/power-conferences-likely-to-receive-
most-of-playoff-revenue. 
 
111.  Decision and Direction of Election, Northwestern Univ., Case 13-RC-121359 
(N.L.R.B. Region 13, Mar. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Regional Director’s Decision]. 
 
112.  Ann Killion, Court Case Could Make or Break Title IX, SF GATE (Apr. 5, 2014, 
11:39 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/collegesports/article/Court-case-could-make-or-break-Title-
IX-5379767.php;  see generally WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 
74-75 (5th ed. 2013); Am. Federation of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940); cf. Leedom v. 
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964).  Although the 
Board’s election decisions cannot be directly appealed to the federal courts, employers can 
transform adverse election decisions into unfair labor practice proceedings by refusing to bargain 
with the union, which can then be appealed. 
 
113.  E.g., Patrick T. Harker, Student Athletes Shouldn’t Unionize, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/opinion/student-athletes-shouldnt-unionize.html; 
Douglas Belkin, Melanie Trottman & Rachel Bachman, College’s Football Team Can Unionize, 
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condemnation eerily reminiscent of the way in which the organization of 
professional sports players was greeted.115  Though Board doctrine relating 
to employee status is not predicated upon revenues received by the 
employer—jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of the volume of business 
conducted across state lines116—the trigger for union organizing no doubt 
finds its roots in the big business that so-called “amateur” sport has 
become.117  Players are not sharing in this.118 
For instance, in Northwestern itself, the Regional Director noted: 
“Players are prohibited from profiting off their image or reputation, 
including the selling of merchandise and autographs. Players are also 
required to sign a release permitting the Employer and the Big Ten 
                                                          
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2014, 12:05 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702303325204579463650558954652; Letter 
to the Editor, Student, Athlete and Employee?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/05/opinion/student-athlete-and-employee.html; cf. Killion, 
supra note 114. 
 
114.  See Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of Unionizing 
Student Athletes, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 
115.  See generally CHARLES P. KORR, THE END OF BASEBALL AS WE KNEW IT: THE 
PLAYERS UNION, 1960-1981 (2002); cf. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL: 
LABOR RELATIONS IN AN AGE OF PROSPEROUS TURMOIL (2011); ROBERT C. BERRY, WILLIAM 
B. GOULD IV & PAUL D. STAUDOHAR, LABOR RELATIONS IN PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (1986). 
 
116.  E.g., 29 C.F.R. § 104.204 (2012); cf. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 
(1957). 
 
117.  See, e.g., Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111 (“The Employer reported to 
the Department of Education that its football team generated total revenues of $235 million and 
incurred total expenses of $159 million between 2003 and 2012. For the 2012-2013 academic 
year, the Employer reported that its football program generated $30.1 million in revenue and 
$21.7 million in expenses.”); see also Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: 
A Legal Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1003-1009 
(2012); Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: 
The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 73-80 (2006). 
 
118.  E.g., Joe Nocera, Opinion, A Step Toward Justice in College Sports?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/opinion/nocera-a-step-toward-justice-in-
college-sports.html; Joe Nocera, Opinion, Unionized College Athletes?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/01/opinion/nocera-unionized-college-athletes.html; Joe 
Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-
athletes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-
shame-of-college-sports/308643/. 
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Conference to utilize their name, likeness and image for any purpose.”119 
As the New Yorker recently observed: 
 
The rationale for the players’ demands, which include 
concussion-testing, extended medical coverage, and more 
manageable practice schedules, is based on a real inequity.  
Football makes lots of money for schools—Northwestern 
says that between 2003 and 2012 it made two hundred and 
thirty-five million dollars in football revenue, including 
lucrative TV deals—and the thought is that those who 
create the value ought to share in it, particularly since a 
sports scholarship, instead of being a guarantee of four 
years of free education, often lasts only as long as the 
player is producing.  The union vote is a subset, in turn, of 
a larger, much talked-of move to pay student players to 
play sports.  This, too, sounds reasonable.  Nick Saban, the 
head coach at the University of Alabama, makes around 
seven million dollars a season; shouldn’t those who do the 
work share the wealth?120 
 
It is no longer a Frank Merriwell-type relationship,121 where 
competition was part-time and subordinated to full-time university student 
commitment.  Today, as the Regional Director found with regard to 
Northwestern University: 
 
[T]he Employer’s scholarship players are identified and 
recruited in the first instance because of their football 
prowess and not because of their academic achievement in 
high school.  Only after the Employer’s football program 
becomes interested in a high school player based on the 
                                                          
119.  Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111.  But see Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C-09-3329-CW (N.D. Cal., Aug. 8, 2014) 
(holding this conduct to be a violation of antitrust law). 
 
120.  Adam Gopnik, Team Spirit, THE NEW YORKER (May 12, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/12/team-spirit-4.  Cf. Associated Press, Donovan, 
Calipari in Bonus Duel at Final Four, USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2014, 7:39 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2014/04/04/donovan-calipari-in-bonus-duel-at-final-
four/7322283 (discussing six-figure bonuses that top college basketball coaches make for 
tournament success).  
 
121.  See BURT L. STANDISH, FRANK MERRIWELL’S LIMIT 1-28 (Tip-Top Weekly, Jan. 6, 
1900); BURT L. STANDISH, FRANK MERRIWELL AT YALE (Street & Smith 1903); THE 
ADVENTURES OF FRANK MERRIWELL (Universal Pictures 1936).  
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potential benefit he might add to the Employer’s football 
program does the potential candidate get vetted through the 
Employer’s recruiting and admissions process.122 
 
A number of the athletic programs, particularly large-revenue 
producing football and basketball,123 as well as low-revenue baseball,124 
have morphed into a kind of minor league125 that historically, even on the 
professional level, have been without protection.126  A symbiotic 
relationship between the professional leagues, such as the National Football 
League and the National Basketball Association (as well as the leagues in 
baseball and hockey), is one in which the farm team or training costs are 
reduced for the small group that advances to major league status.127  There 
                                                          
122.  Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111. 
 
123.  William B. Gould IV, Bargaining, Race, and Globalization: How Baseball and 
Other Sports Mirror Collective Bargaining, Law, and Life, 48 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013). 
 
124.  Id.  Whereas Division I football teams are allotted eighty-five full-time scholarships, 
comparable baseball teams are limited to a mere 11.7 scholarships to disperse across the entire 
team, and individual players rarely receive full scholarships. See Bob Nightengale, MLB Hopes to 
Invigorate African-American Participation, USA TODAY (Apr. 10, 2013, 3:24 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ 
mlb/2013/04/10/mlb-bud-selig-creates-diversity-task-force/2071305; Gregory Ruehlmann, The 
Incredibly White College World Series, THE ROOT (June 20, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.theroot.com/views/incredibly-white-college-world-series. 
 
125.   Gopnik, supra note 120 (“The N.F.L. and the N.B.A., which profit indecently from 
the free development of talent provided by colleges, need to start their own minor leagues, and 
the colleges should threaten non-participation in events like the draft in order to pressure them to 
do so.”).  But the leagues are unlikely to do so at present, because of the enormous revenues that 
they received in the context of this relationship. Similarly, the colleges will not be likely to alter 
the status quo given the fact that they profit from the symbiotic connection with the professional 
leagues and the prospect that their leading players will emerge as outstanding pros. 
 
126.  See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Triple-A Baseball Club 
Assocs. v. Ne. Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1987). But see David M. Szuchman, Note, 
Step Up to the Bargaining Table: A Call for the Unionization of Minor League Baseball, 14 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 265, 299-303 (1996) (discussing the unionization of the professional 
hockey minor leagues). Recently, former minor league baseball players filed a class action in 
federal court claiming systematic violations of federal and state wage and hour laws. See 
Complaint for Violations of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws, Senne v. Office of the 
Comm’r of Baseball, No. 3:14CV00608 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2014), 2014 WL 545501. 
 
127.  See e.g., David Lariviere, New Pro Football Launch May Eventually Serve as NFL’s 
D League, FORBES (May 7, 2014, 10:07 AM) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidlariviere/2014/05/07/new-pro-football-launch-may-eventually-
serve-as-nfls-d-league/; Tom Ziller, Is the NBA D-League Almost a Real Minor League?, SB 
NATION (Aug. 8, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2013/8/8/4601398/nba-
dleague-expansion-minor-league; Lily Rothman, Emancipation of the Minors, SLATE (Apr. 3, 
2012, 11:08 AM), 
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has been considerable litigation about controls imposed upon applicants 
and the timing of their entry to professional status.128  Deeply intertwined 
with this process is the issue of race, both football and basketball 
possessing a disproportionately high percentage of black American players, 
many or most of whom will not graduate from the university or establish 
themselves in the major leagues.129 
The idea of unions in so-called amateur athletics seems 
revolutionary.  Yet only half a century ago, unions did not exist in 
professional sports.  Now, all of the major leagues in all major sports are 
organized by unions—a phenomenon acquiesced in by professional league 
owners out of fear of antitrust liability in all sports except baseball.130 
B. The Legal Framework 
Two overriding lines of authority intersect here.  The first, from 
which colleges and universities take some comfort, is the reticence 
displayed by the Supreme Court in addressing university employment 
relationships on the same basis as commercial enterprises.131  Though the 
Board, reversing itself, has exercised jurisdiction over universities,132 and 
though public-employment labor-relations statutes have covered 
(sometimes explicitly or through separate statute133) higher education, the 
                                                          
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2012/04/minor_league_union_thousands_of_pro_
baseball_players_make_just_1_100_per_month_where_is_their_c_sar_ch_vez_.html; Adam 
Fusfeld, Minor League Hockey Team Thinks NHL Affiliate Is Hurting Its Profits, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Nov. 1, 2010, 2:48 PM) http://www.businessinsider.com/a-minor-league-hockey-team-
thinks-its-nhl-affiliate-is-draining-profits-2010-11. 
 
128.  Cf. Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971); Clarett v. Nat’l 
Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005); Wood v. Nat’l 
Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 
129.  See Gould, supra note 123, at 8-11. 
 
130.  See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); Radovich v. Nat’l Football 
League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969); cf. 
Federal Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 
(1922); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 
(1972). See generally William B. Gould IV, Labor Issues in Professional Sports: Reflections on 
Baseball, Labor, and Antitrust Law, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61 (2004). 
 
131.  See e.g., Brown, 518 U.S. 231; Flood, 407 U.S. 258; Radovich, 352 U.S. 445; 
Toolson, 346 U.S. 356; Federal Baseball Club of Balt., Inc., 259 U.S. 200. 
 
132.  See Cornell Univ., 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). 
 
133.  E.g., Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act of 1978; CAL. GOV. 
CODE §§ 3560-3599 (West 2013). 
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Court’s landmark Yeshiva decision134—where it said that the “principles 
developed for the industrial setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on the 
academic world’”135—expresses caution.  Closely related to this is the line 
of Board authority that seems to have treated student-employees differently 
from other employees because they are students.136  This was illustrated 
most recently by the Board’s decision in Brown University,137 relied upon 
by the universities in connection with unionization of athletes, holding that 
graduate teaching assistants are not employees given the fact that their 
work is so closely connected to the educational mission of the university.138 
But this has run up against the broad characterization of the word 
“employee” within the meaning of the NLRA provided by a unanimous 
Supreme Court in the 1990s.139  There, the Court endorsed the common law 
definition of employee, and held that an employee is a person who 
performs services for another under contract of hire subject to the other’s 
control or right of control in return for benefit or payment.140  Except for 
truly volunteer employer-employee relationships,141 or temporary 
employees who have a certain date for termination,142 such individuals are 
                                                          
134.  NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980). 
 
135.  Id. at 681 (quoting Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 643 (1973)). 
 
136.  E.g., S.F. Art Inst., 226 N.L.R.B. 1251, 1251 (1976); Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
214 N.L.R.B. 621, 621 (1974); Adelphi Univ., 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 640 (1972). 
 
137.  Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 493 (2004).  This decision reversed New York 
University, 332 N.L.R.B. 1205, 1209 (2000).  Subsequently, the Board appeared to express 
disagreement with Brown University by granting a petition for review in New York University, 
356 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (2010), but the union withdrew its petition and negotiated a collective 
bargaining agreement with the university subsequent to obtaining majority status through a 
privately conducted process. 
 
138.  Brown Univ., 342 N.L.R.B. at 487 (“It is clear to us that graduate student assistants, 
including those at Brown, are primarily students and have a primarily educational, not economic, 
relationship with their university.”). 
 
139.  NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1995). 
 
140.  Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. at 90-92 (“The ordinary dictionary definition 
of ‘employee’ includes any ‘person who works for another in return for financial or other 
compensation.’ . . . The phrasing of the Act seems to reiterate the breadth of the ordinary 
dictionary definition . . . [and] literal interpretation of the word ‘employee’ is consistent with 
several of the Act’s purposes.”). 
 
141.  E.g., WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1276 (1999). 
 
142.  E.g., MJM Studios of N.Y., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 1255, 1257-58 (2001) (discussing 
“date certain” test for temporary-employee status).  Cf. Personal Prods. Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 959, 
960-961 (1955). 
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employees.  For instance, the Board has held that medical interns in a three- 
to seven-year residency program are employees.143  Thus, the key test is 
whether there is both benefit and control. 
Athletic scholarship players at Northwestern—on the football team 
there are 85 of 112 who fit within that category and thus are part of the 
appropriate bargaining unit for the purposes of the NLRA—have received 
approximately $61,000 per academic year in a grant of aid.144  Clearly this 
is a benefit, though when considered against the poverty line, and the fact 
that revenue sharing at the professional level would at least double this 
amount, it is relatively small.  A recent standout in the NCAA tournament 
contended that his scholarship left him at times going to bed hungry at 
night.145  But it is a benefit nonetheless for the purpose of the common law 
test adopted by the Supreme Court. 
Of course, in addition to benefits, security is also important, and 
although the scholarships were year-to-year and, under NCAA rules as of 
two years ago, predicated upon athletic performance and not academics, 
colleges are now permitted to provide multi-year awards.  Though 
Northwestern provides a four-year scholarship with an option for a fifth 
year, the Chronicle of Higher Education found that relatively few Division 
I public universities do so for more than a “handful of athletes.”146  At the 
wealthiest programs, new “entitlements” for young athletes are decried, and 
the University of Texas at Austin, University of Oregon, Texas A&M, 
University of Arizona, Georgia Tech, and University of Louisville have a 
very small number of multi-year awards.147  Of course, in basketball there 
is the notorious “one and done,” i.e. the advance of players to the NBA 
after just one year at the university.148  There was considerable resistance 
                                                          
143.  Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, 166 (1999). 
 
144.  Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111.  In general, qualified scholarships are 
exempt from taxable gross income.  26 U.S.C. § 117 (2012).  There is an exception for 
scholarships that represent “payment for teaching, research, or other services by the student 
required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarship,” 26 U.S.C. § 117(c)(1) (2012), yet 
the IRS has never interpreted athletic scholarships as falling within this category. 
 
145.  Soraya Nadia McDonald, National Champ U-Conn.’s Napier Says He Goes to Bed 
Starving, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/04/08/national-champ-uconns-napier-says-he-goes-to-bed-starving. 
 
146.  Brad Wolverton & Jonah Newman, Few Athletes Benefit from Move to Multiyear 
Scholarships, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 19, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/Few-
Athletes-Benefit-From-Move/138643/. 
 
147.  Id. 
 
148.  NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, December 2011, Art. X, § 1(b)(i) available 
at http://www.nbpa.org/cba/2011; see Alex Berg, Opinion, Viewpoint:  One and Done Rule Bad 
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and a near repeal of the new rule: “[s]everal Southeastern Conference 
institutions—including Louisiana State University, the University of 
Tennessee, and Texas A&M University—are largely opposed to the 
multiyear approach.149  But some of the league’s teams have used multiyear 
awards when necessary to land recruits.”150  The multi-year agreement 
provides the athletes, whom the universities claim are being recruited as 
student-athletes, to remain in the university even when their skills either 
decline, do not realize promise, or cannot be utilized because of injury.151 
Meanwhile, the controls are considerable.  In order to obtain 
outside employment at Northwestern, for instance, permission must be 
obtained from the athletic department.152  Only media interviews arranged 
by the athletic department are allowed.153  Restrictions are imposed upon 
online postings.154  The players are subject to a strict drug and alcohol 
policy,155 and a dress code is in effect.156  During the first two years, 
players must live in on-campus dormitories, and upperclassmen must 
submit their lease to the coach for approval.157 
Beginning the first week in August, there is a month-long training 
camp158 and summer workouts conducted by strength and conditioning 
coaches can take up to twenty-five hours per week.159  Though the rules 
only permit four hours of practice per day,160 other drills are held outside 
                                                          
for Athletes, USA TODAY (June 27, 2012), http://college.usatoday.com/2012/06/27/opinion-one-
and-done-rule-bad-for-athletes/.  
 
149.  Wolverton & Newman, supra note 146. 
 
150.  Id. 
 
151.  Cf. Id. 
 
152.  Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111, at 4. 
 
153.  Id. 5. 
 
154.  Id. 
 
155.  Id. 
 
156.  Id. at 16. 
 
157.  Id. at 3. 
 
158.  Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111, at 5. 
 
159.  Id. at 8-9. 
 
160.  Id. at 6. 
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the presence of coaches,161 and players go to the coaches’ offices in the 
evening for a couple of hours of game-film watching.162  During the regular 
football season, the players are involved with the program for at least forty 
to fifty hours per week.163 
C. The Education Defense 
The principal defense of the universities and colleges is that 
athletes are not employees within the meaning of the NLRA, since Brown 
University held that teaching assistants are not employees inasmuch as they 
are “primarily” involved in an educational enterprise.164  But as the 
Regional Director found, the same cannot be said of football players who 
are supervised by non-academic coaches,165 in contrast to graduate students 
who are under the tutelage of professors.166  Moreover, as the Board itself 
noted, the Brown University doctrine is problematic because involvement 
with the educational enterprise and professors ought not remove individuals 
from employee status.167 
Again, Yeshiva has noted that universities are different.168  But to 
the extent that issues in collective bargaining may involve grades or class 
hours or academics, the answer is not for the Board to refuse to assert 
jurisdiction, but rather to hold that such subject matter is non-mandatory 
                                                          
161.  Id. at 6-7. 
 
162.  Id. at 7. 
 
163.  Id. at 6. 
 
164.  Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. at 488. 
 
165.  Regional Director’s Decision, supra note 111, at 19. 
 
166. Id. at 18. 
 
167.  McCormick & McCormick, supra note 117, at 121 (“At the outset, it bears 
remembering that the Board in Brown did not foreclose graduate student assistants from 
employee status solely because they were students. That is, the Board did not rule in Brown that 
students and employees are two mutually exclusive categories.”); Id. at 121-28 (distinguishing 
Brown from the student-athlete context on the grounds that athletes play a limited role as 
students, that athletic participation does not contribute to education, that athletes are supervised 
by coaching staff instead of faculty, and that athletic scholarships are compensation for athletic 
services and not merely financial aid). 
 
168.  Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 680-81. 
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within the meaning of the NLRA under First National Maintenance169 and 
its progeny.170 
The Board, for instance, has taken jurisdiction over government 
contractors even though the contracts that they enter into with the 
government are beyond the jurisdiction of the NLRA and the Board and 
may preclude collective bargaining over many issues.171  Sometimes the 
Board has stressed the proposition that “most, if not all, matters relating to 
the employment relationship” are to be controlled by the entity that is in a 
relationship with the government.172  In the landmark Management 
Training case, the Board held that the employer must “control some 
matters relating to the employment relationship” in order to be an employer 
within the meaning of the NLRA.173  When disputes arise, again, the 
fundamental concern ought to be where the duty of bargain parameters lies, 
rather than jurisdiction itself.174  Thus, though some issues may be 
controlled by the NCAA or by public employers beyond the jurisdiction of 
the statute, the employer may be able to address some subject matter at the 
bargaining table. 
Similarly, even though editorial matters are beyond the collective 
bargaining process by virtue of the First Amendment, the Board has 
asserted jurisdiction over newspapers.175  In education itself, 
notwithstanding the issues relating to freedom of religion or freedom of 
speech,176 the Board nonetheless asserts jurisdiction over education in the 
                                                          
169.  First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-675 (1981); see also William 
B. Gould, The Supreme Court’s Labor and Employment Docket in the 1980 Term: Justice 
Brennan’s Term, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 6-17 (1981).  
 
170.  E.g., NLRB v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 432 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005); Dubuque Packing 
Co., Inc., 303 N.L.R.B. 386 (1991).  cf. Q-1 Motor Exp., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 767, 769 (1997) 
(Chairman Gould Concurring). 
 
171.  The circuit courts have uniformly supported the Board’s holdings.  See, e.g., 
Aramark Corp. v. NLRB, 179 F.3d 872 (10th Cir. 1999); Pikeville United Methodist Hosp. of 
Kentucky v. United Steelworkers of Am., 109 F.3d 1146 (6th Cir. 1997); Teledyne Econ. Dev. v. 
NLRB, 108 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 1997); NLRB v. Fed. Sec., Inc., 154 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 
172.  Chicago Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (Dec. 
14, 2012); see also Recana Solutions, 349 N.L.R.B. 1163 (2007). 
 
173.  Mgmt. Training Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 1355, 1358 (1995). 
 
174.  See id. at 1357 (“Nor should the Board be deciding as a jurisdictional question which 
terms and conditions of employment are or are not essential to the bargaining process.”). 
 
175.  See, e.g., Ampersand Publ’g, LLC v. NLRB, 702 F.3d 51 (2012); Ampersand 
Publ’g, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 127 (May 31, 2013). 
 
176.  Cf. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
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private sector.177  This all illustrates that, regardless of the sincerity of 
concerns about the integrity of universities’ educational missions, the mere 
assertion of jurisdiction by the Board does not necessitate bargaining 
between athletes and the university over education-related issues.  The 
Board has the ability to except certain issues from the status of mandatory 
bargaining subjects—and need not avoid the issue entirely by declining to 
assert jurisdiction over college athletes as “employees.” 
D. Implications for Federal and State Taxation of College Athletes 
In addition to misplaced cries about the sanctity of education and 
the need to preserve the student-school relationship discussed above, critics 
of unionization have also warned of increased taxation of college athlete 
“employees” if the Regional Director’s decision is upheld.178  However, 
decisions by the Board have no legal force on the federal or state agencies 
that administer the separate statutes governing taxation and other 
employee-benefit issues, and thus there is no clear causal relationship that 
would lead to new taxation.179  Contrary to some popular perceptions, the 
                                                          
177.  E.g., Chicago Mathematics & Sci. Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 41; 
Windsor Sch., 200 N.L.R.B. 991 (1972). 
 
178.  E.g., Darren Rovell, Players Could Get Big Tax Bill, ESPN (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/10683398/tax-implications-create-hurdle-players-
union; Alejandro Cancino, Northwestern Ruling Could Lead Athletes Paying Taxes on 
Scholarships, CHIC. TRIB. (Mar. 28, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-03-
28/business/chi-northwestern-union-taxes-20140327_1_athletic-scholarships-football-players-
state-taxes; Paul Caron, Northwestern Athletes May Face Big Tax Hit From Unionization Victory, 
TAXPROF BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/03/northwestern-
athletes.html; Kevin Trahan, Clarity Sought as Northwestern Football’s Labor Effort Evolves, 
USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2014, 2:43 AM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2014/03/31/college-football-ncpa-capa-nlrb-chicago-
northwestern-labor-union/7077455/. 
 
179.  E.g., Paseiro v. C.I.R., 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1432, 1435 (1977) (“Contrary to the 
contention of the petitioner, a ruling by the National Labor Relations Board that hospital residents 
are students rather than employees under the National Labor Relations Act does not determine the 
proper classification of petitioner under [the Internal Revenue Code].”); see also Woodling v. 
C.I.R., 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1766, 1767-68 (1976) (“Whatever [the Cedars-Sinai decision’s] effect 
in other areas, such a determination is in no way binding on us in construing the tax laws.”); Bretz 
v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 278 (1978) (“[T]he classification or definition as an employee under 
the labor laws is not controlling in tax cases . . . .”); Hales v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 946 (1978) 
(“Petitioner’s student analogy to the decision of the NLRB that certain hospital interns and 
residents are not employees for collective bargaining purposes is also inapposite.”); Tsou v. 
C.I.R., 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 56, 59 (1980) (“[T]he findings of the NLRB . . . have no bearing upon 
the tax issue here involved.”); Saber v. C.I.R., 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 945, 948 (1981) (“[P]etitioner’s 
contention that rulings by the National Labor Relations Board that medical residents are students 
should control our decision is without merit.”). 
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fact that college athletes might possess a federal right to unionize does not 
mean they will suddenly be receiving taxable wages, or that the Internal 
Revenue Service will suddenly reverse decades of countervailing precedent 
in order to tax them.180 
In the late 1970s, the Board determined that medical-student 
interns, residents, and clinical fellows were not statutory “employees” 
within the meaning of the NLRA.181  As one might expect, this decision 
fostered a host of challenges by interns and residents who sought to have 
their earnings from such positions—which primarily came in the form of 
grants and stipends182—excluded from their taxable income inasmuch as 
they were not “employees.”  However, both the IRS and the U.S. Tax Court 
consistently rejected these challenges on the grounds that the definition of 
“employee” under federal labor law is distinct from the definition of 
“employee” under federal tax law.183  In a formal Revenue Ruling, the IRS 
stated that: “The standards used for determining whether individuals are 
employees for purposes of labor relations are not the same as those used for 
purposes of Federal taxation.”184  Indeed, the IRS only felt the need to 
clarify the issue in the first place “so that the public will not erroneously 
rely on the Board’s decision . . . .”185 
                                                          
180.  E.g., Paseiro v. C.I.R., 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1435 ; see also Woodling v. C.I.R., 35 
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1767-68; Bretz v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 278; Hales v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 946; Tsou v. C.I.R., 40 T.C.M. (CCH) at 59 (1980); Saber v. C.I.R., 42 T.C.M. (CCH) at 
948 (1981). 
 
181.  Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.L.R.B. 251 (1976); see also St. Clare’s Hosp. & 
Health Ctr., 229 N.L.R.B. 1000 (1977).  These decisions were overruled twenty years later by 
Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 152, and medical-student residents and interns continue to 
be recognized as statutory employees even after Brown University, 342 N.L.R.B. 483. See Brown 
University, 342 N.L.R.B. at 494 n.5 (2004) (declining to overrule Boston Medical). 
 
182.  In the context of scholarship athletes, two distinct interpretations of the Internal 
Revenue Code seem relevant: first, whether such athletes are “employees” within the meaning of 
the statute; and second, whether the athletic scholarships themselves fall within the exception to 
non-taxable qualified scholarships contained in 26 U.S.C. § 117 (2012).  However, the right-to-
control inquiry under the common-law test for employee status—see, e.g., Blodgett v. C.I.R., 104 
T.C.M. 500 (2012)—and the inquiry into whether the scholarships are “payment for . . . services 
by the student required as a condition for receiving the qualified scholarships,” 26 U.S.C. 
§ 117(c)(1), appear to substantially overlap for purposes of the present analysis. 
 
183.  E.g., Paseiro v. C.I.R., 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1435 ; see also Woodling v. C.I.R., 35 
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1767-68; Bretz v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 278; Hales v. C.I.R., 37 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 946; Tsou v. C.I.R., 40 T.C.M. (CCH) at 59 (1980); Saber v. C.I.R., 42 T.C.M. (CCH) at 
948 (1981). 
 
184.  Rev. Rul. 78-54, 1978-1 C.B. 36.  
 
185.  I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,277 (Sept. 29, 1977). 
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Although these rulings rejecting a direct equivalence between an 
individual’s status for tax purposes and his or her status under other federal 
statutory regimes have a long historical precedent,186 one could argue that 
their continued validity might be questioned to the extent that they relied 
on older Supreme Court opinions endorsing a functionalist approach to 
employee status under federal law.187  In the 1990s, the Court gestured 
toward a more uniform application of common-law principles in 
determining employee status.188  However, as noted previously, in the 
1990s the Court also recognized a broad conception of employee status 
under the NLRA in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.189  In that case, 
the Court distinguished between decisions by courts interpreting an 
ambiguous federal statute—in which case the presumption of common-law 
agency doctrine prevails—and decisions by the Board interpreting the 
NLRA, in which case the “Board’s construction of [the term ‘employee’] is 
entitled to considerable deference,” unless the Board departs so far from 
the common-law doctrine so as to “render[] its interpretation 
unreasonable.”190 
Thus, there remains substantial latitude between Board decisions 
regarding employee status for the purposes of federal labor law,191 and 
employee status under other statutory regimes—including federal tax 
                                                          
186.  See, e.g., Loo v. C.I.R., 22 T.C. 220, 224-25 (1954) (holding that petitioner’s status 
under federal immigration law as determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service was 
irrelevant for the purposes of determining the classification of income for taxation purposes); 
Guaranty State Bank of Greenville, Tex. v. C.I.R., 12 B.T.A. 543, 547 (1928) (holding that 
findings of Texas Banking Commissioner were not binding and were “without any probative 
force”).  
 
187.  E.g., Rev. Rul. 78-54, 1978-1 C.B. 36 (citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 
(1947); NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 136-37 (1944).  But see I.R.S. Information 
Letter 2014-0016, 2014 WL 2958209 (June 27, 2014) (noting that the IRS has reaffirmed the fact 
that “employee” status for labor law purposes does not control “employee” status for purposes of 
the Internal Revenue Code in the wake of the Northwestern decision). 
 
188.  See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) (adopting the 
common-law definition of “employee” under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and 
dismissing Hearst and Silk as “feeble precedents for unmooring the term from the common 
law.”). 
 
189.  Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85. 
 
190.  Id. at 94 (citations omitted). 
 
191.  Cf., e.g., Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967) (discharged employee); 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (job applicants).  The Board also declines 
jurisdiction over workers who are likely “employees” for tax purposes, such as certain temporary 
employees.  Cf. MJM Studios of N.Y., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. at 1257-58; Personal Prods. Corp., 114 
N.L.R.B. at 960-62.  
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law.192  The Board often resorts to the explicit common-law test, but the 
Board nonetheless retains broader discretion to determine the bounds of the 
NLRA.193  Indeed, the very issue before the Board in reviewing 
Northwestern’s appeal of the Regional Director’s decision—whether 
scholarship athletes are excluded as statutory “employees” because they are 
“primarily students” under the Brown University test—arises from a prior 
Board decision determining employee status beyond the common-law test 
alone.194  And since there is still considerable variation between the 
policies underlying employee status for federal labor law versus federal tax 
law, there remains no justification for the IRS to base its interpretation of 
the Internal Revenue Code on the Board’s interpretation of the NLRA.  The 
IRS itself has recently reaffirmed this position in response to an inquiry 
from Senator Richard Burr regarding the Northwestern case, and has 
signaled its intention to adhere to existing IRS precedent regarding the tax 
treatment of athletic scholarships.195  According to a June 2014 IRS 
Information Letter, and consistent with the precedent discussed above, 
“whether an individual is treated as an employee for labor law purposes is 
not controlling of whether the individual is an employee for federal tax 
purposes.”196 
The lack of equivalence regarding employee status extends both 
ways, and the Board and courts reviewing Board decisions have no greater 
                                                          
192.  Cf. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2634-36, 2638 (2014) (examining employee 
status at the state level and recognizing the varying policy considerations that attach to the 
distinction between “full-fledged state employees” who are treated as covered employees in a 
wide range of contexts, and workers who are covered “employees” within the meaning of a single 
statute or statutory provision—such as the definition of homecare personal assistants as “public 
employees” solely for collective bargaining purposes under the Illinois Public Labor Relations 
Act). 
 
193.  Cf., e.g., Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967) (discharged employee); 
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (job applicants). The Board also declines 
jurisdiction over workers who are likely “employees” for tax purposes, such as certain temporary 
employees.  Cf. MJM Studios of N.Y., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. at 1257-58; Personal Prods. Corp., 114 
N.L.R.B. at 960-62. 
 
194.  See, e.g., Br. to the Regional Director on Behalf of Northwestern University 51, Mar. 
17, 2014, ECF No. 13-RC-121359 (“As the [Brown University] Board explained, even assuming 
arguendo that students are employees under a common law definition, ‘it does not follow that 
they are employees within the meaning of the Act.’” (citation omitted)); Br. to the Regional 
Director on Behalf of Northwestern University 52, Mar. 17, 2014, ECF No. 13-RC-121359 
(“[C]ommon law agency principles cannot be forced onto the enrolled student who engages in 
voluntary co-curricular activities.”). 
 
195.  I.R.S. Information Letter 2014-0016, 2014 WL 2958209 (June 27, 2014). 
 
196.  Id. 
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basis for relying on decisions by the IRS.197  This is true not only in the 
context of employee status, but also in the context of classifying 
employees’ compensation—for example, courts have endorsed the Board’s 
inclusion of unreported tips in calculating back pay awards, despite the fact 
that employees paid no taxes on such income.198  Similarly, the fact that an 
employer did not consider individuals to be “employees” for the purposes 
of tax withholdings and other deductions has no bearing on whether those 
individuals are “employees” within the meaning of the NLRA.199  These 
examples all demonstrate that, at the very least, the IRS certainly has no 
obligation to modify its long-standing policy of excluding college athletes 
from taxation simply because the Board has granted such athletes the 
protections of the NLRA. 
The more complicated question is whether tax agencies—at least at 
the state level—even can base a change in tax policy on the resolution of 
the Northwestern players’ election petition.  In addition to the threat of 
federal taxation, another main source of worry for college athletes might be 
taxation at the state level.200  However, while the above discussion of the 
relationship between the IRS and Board decisions is not directly applicable 
in the state context, there may be an even greater obstacle to state reliance 
on a Board determination that scholarships athletes are “employees” 
covered by the NLRA: federal preemption.201  States are generally granted 
                                                          
197.  See, e.g., FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 511 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(“It is to the precedents of the Board, and not to those of the Internal Revenue Service, that we 
owe deference, as only the former is charged with enforcing the provisions of the NLRA.”); 
Truman Med. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 570, 573 n.2 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[R]ulings of the 
Internal Revenue Service are not determinative of the meaning of the section 2(2) exemption for 
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.”); Local 777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. 
NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 
198.  E.g., Atl. Limousine, Inc. v. NLRB, 243 F.3d 711, 717-18, 719 (3d Cir. 2001); 
NLRB v. Lee Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1347, 1347 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
199.  See Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 763-64,  n.8 (D.C. Cir. 2002); NLRB v. 
Amber Delivery Serv., Inc., 651 F.2d 57, 61-62 (1st Cir. 1981); J. Huizinga Cartage Co. v. 
NLRB, 941 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1991); NLRB v. Keystone Floors, Inc., 306 F.2d 560, 561, 
563 (3d Cir. 1962).  But see I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 200948042, 2009 WL 4092540 (Nov. 27, 
2009) (suggesting that NLRB Regional Director’s conclusion that workers were not common-law 
employees could constitute a “reasonable basis” for employer to rely on such conclusion in 
having mistakenly not treated workers as employees for tax purposes). 
 
200.  E.g., Rovell, supra note 178; Cancino, supra note 178; Caron, supra note 178; 
Trahan, supra note 178. 
 
201.  See Bo Newsome, Are Scholarship Athletes Employees? NLRB Ruling Prompts 
House Hearing, NAT’L ASS’N. OF INDEP. COLLS. & UNIVS. (May 19, 2014) 
http://www.naicu.edu/news_room/news_detail.asp?id=20362. 
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broad freedom against federal interference in the collection of taxes,202 but 
here the hypothetical is that state agencies would base a reconsideration of 
college athletes’ tax status on a determination by the Board made in the 
context of a union representation petition.  In other words, a change in 
policy on the state level triggered by the Board’s decision would make the 
Northwestern players newly liable for taxation as a direct result of their 
having petitioned the Board for a representation election and their having 
pursued a claim of employee status before the Board.203 
There is a plausible argument that any state decision triggered by 
the Board’s resolution of the Northwestern case would be unconstitutional 
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.  Constitution,204 based on the 
theory that such a decision would constitute interference with a field 
preempted by federal law.  The NLRA and the federal law of labor 
relations give rise to an expansive doctrine of preemption.205  This doctrine 
encompasses the understanding that states must sometimes cede authority 
in order to preserve the federal scheme for labor relations,206 as well as the 
understanding that a state’s withholding or granting of certain benefits 
under state law can unduly interfere with the federal scheme.207  A state 
decision to base its reconsideration of individuals’ tax status on Board 
proceedings might constitute just such undue interference. 
In Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, the Supreme Court was 
faced with a similar preemption issue.208  In that case, a Florida agency had 
interpreted the state’s unemployment compensation statute such that 
                                                          
202.  Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cnty. Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336, 344 (1989) (“The 
States . . . have broad powers to impose and collect taxes.”).  But see, e.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep’t 
of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 810-11 (1989) (discussing the holding in McCulloch v. Maryland). 
 
203.  See Newsome, supra note 201. 
 
204.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 
205.  See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t 
Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 136-55 n.3 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. 
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 236, 244 (1959); see also William B. Gould, The Garmon Case: Decline 
and Threshold of Litigating Elucidation, 39 U. DET. MERCY L.J. 539, 539-40 (1962). 
 
206.  E.g., NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971) (holding that the Board 
has implied authority to seek federal injunctions against state court orders interfering with the 
administration of federal labor law).  
 
207.  E.g., Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 
287 (1986) (holding that state law preventing employers with multiple unfair labor practice 
violations from receiving government contracts was preempted). 
 
208.  Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n 389 U.S. 235, 236--38 (1967). 
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individuals, like the petitioner, who filed unfair labor practice charges with 
the Board would be excluded from receiving unemployment benefits while 
the charges were still pending.209  The Court held that the state decision 
was a coercive deterrent to individuals filing charges with the Board, and 
therefore was preempted by the NLRA.210  According to the Court: 
“Florida should not be permitted to defeat or handicap a valid national 
objective by threatening to withdraw state benefits from persons simply 
because they cooperate with the Government’s constitutional plan.”211 
Much like the state decision at issue in Nash, if a state agency 
bases its reconsideration of whether to tax college athletes on those 
athletes’ successful petition to the Board, the “financial burden . . . 
impose[d] will impede resort to the [NLRA] and thwart congressional 
reliance on individual action.”212  Quite simply, if individual workers or 
classes of workers learn that petitioning the Board for employee status or 
for a union-representation election might cause them to become newly 
liable for state taxation, such workers will be faced with an “unappetizing 
choice”213 between either federal labor protections or continued tax-free 
status, and thus will be less willing to enforce their rights under federal law.  
Furthermore, the intrusion of state tax determinations would disrupt the 
goal of the NLRA in securing the “‘uniform application’ of its substantive 
rules and [in avoiding] the ‘diversities and conflicts likely to result from a 
variety of local procedures and attitudes . . . . ‘“214  Decisions by individual 
states that proceedings before the Board can serve as legitimate grounds for 
reconsidering individuals’ state tax obligations would create a national 
                                                          
209.  Id. at 236-37 (the agency determined that filing charges with the Board created an 
ongoing “‘labor dispute’” within the definition of the state statute).  
 
210.  Id. at 239. 
 
211.  Id. 
 
212.  Id.; see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 117-18 (1994) (finding state 
decision, which waived state wage-payment penalties against employers for employees covered 
by certain collective-bargaining agreements, to be preempted by the NLRA:  “[T]he [state 
official] has presented Livadas and others like her with the choice of having state-law rights under 
§§ 201 and 203 enforced or exercising the right to enter into a collective-bargaining agreement 
with an arbitration clause . . . . This unappetizing choice, we conclude, . . . cannot ultimately be 
reconciled with a statutory scheme premised on the centrality of the right to bargain collectively 
. . . .”). 
 
213.  Livadas, 512 U.S. at 117. 
 
214.  NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971) (quoting Garner v. Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953)). 
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patchwork whereby workers in one state are shackled with greater 
deterrents to petitioning the Board than workers in an adjacent state. 
Of course, as a general matter, a state determination that college 
athletes are taxable employees does not automatically conflict with federal 
law.215  But states have declined to tax college athletes for decades, and it is 
unclear what the justification for changing course now would be other than 
the Northwestern case and the possible introduction of a union.216  The 
question of whether the taxation of college athletes is permissible under 
state tax statutes, which do not themselves conflict with federal law, is 
fundamentally irrelevant, since “[p]re-emption analysis, rather, turns on the 
actual content of [the state’s] policy and its real effect on federal rights.”217  
If a state agency’s determination that college athletes are taxable is 
ultimately based upon, or is a direct result of, an independent decision by 
the Board in enforcing the NLRA, then the state’s actions would begin to 
raise serious questions of federal preemption. 
 
IV. POTENTIAL FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
A. Introduction 
As has been demonstrated, there are numerous questions of law yet 
to be answered.  It remains to be seen whether a Board decision, and/or a 
possible federal appeals court decision, or a U.S. Supreme Court decision 
will ultimately decide on and resolve their various issues.  Of course, there 
also remains the possibility of a settlement, which might resolve some of 
their issues.  For example, a Board decision may leave open the state and 
federal taxation question.  However, a decision by the Board, followed by a 
                                                          
215.  Nor, as a general matter, was Florida under any inherent obligation to provide the 
petitioner in Nash with unemployment benefits.  The constitutional issue arose from the nexus 
between the state’s decision and the petitioner’s proceedings before the Board. 
 
216.  State policies explicitly linking differential taxation to union membership might be 
more clearly preempted by section 7 of the NLRA and by San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. 
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).  Such direct interference with employees’ section 7 rights might 
also be grounds for damages actions against state officials in their individual capacities under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  The Supreme Court has recognized a section 1983 cause of action under 
the NLRA.  See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132-34 (1994); Golden State Transit Corp. 
v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989).  However, in general the Court has also strongly undercut 
plaintiffs’ ability to challenge the collection of state taxes, and at a minimum plaintiffs might be 
required to bring a section 1983 action in state court due to the so-called Tax Anti-Injunction Act, 
26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), as well as principles of comity. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate v. 
McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981). 
 
217.  Livadas, 512 U.S. at 119 (citing Nash v. Fla. Indust. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235). 
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vote in unionization and a subsequent collective bargaining agreement 
between the players and the Northwestern University, may sufficiently 
change the characterization of the players such that the IRS or a state taxing 
agency might have the grounds to tax the players. 
This section will explore the range of possible ramifications of 
continued litigation success of the petitioners in Northwestern University 
and/or a possible settlement in the case.  This allows us to consider the 
range of the potential impact, as well as the magnitude.  It is important to 
understand the ramifications, not only on the parties involved (CAPA, 
Northwestern Football players), but also for similarly situated parties 
(college football players at private universities and possibly public 
universities).  It is also important to understand that a shift in the dynamics, 
relationship, legal status, etc. in football, because of its significant 
dominance on college athletic departments, will potentially have a 
significant impact on the rest of the athletic department, its sports, student-
athletes, coaches and other staff, and administrators. 
B. Increasing Athletic Aid to Cost of Attendance 
If student-athletes are successful in reform efforts, the amount of 
financial aid provided to student-athletes will likely increase, particularly 
those in revenue generating sports like football and men’s basketball.  One 
example, especially in a settlement scenario, is increasing athletic 
scholarships to the full cost of attendance218 (unionization and subsequent 
collective bargaining negotiations will likely result in greater amounts).  By 
NCAA mandate, “full-ride” athletic scholarships are limited to the cost of 
tuition and fees, room and board, and required course-related materials,219 
leaving student athletics to cover personal expenses and travel from their 
hometown to the university and vice versa.  Consequently, full-grant in aid 
scholarships approved by the NCAA do not cover the full cost to attend a 
college or university as a full time student.  For example, Northwestern 
University estimates it will cost undergraduate students a total of $65,554 
to attend the university for one year as a full time student, yet because 
athletic scholarships sanctioned by the NCAA do not cover personal 
                                                          
218.  Cost of attendance is the full and reasonable estimated cost to complete a full-year at 
a college or university set by each individual academic institution and includes tuition and fees, 
room and board, required course material and other personal expenses including travel.  For an 
example, see Cost of Attendance, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, 
http://undergradaid.northwestern.edu/eligibility-and-policies/financial-eligibility/cost-of-
attendance.html (last visited Aug. 23). 
 
219.  2013-2014 NCAA Division I Manual art. 15.02.5 
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expenses of transportation, student athletes at Northwestern are only 
eligible to receive a scholarship up to $63,589, creating a financial gap of 
$1,965.220 Similarly, the financial gap at the University of Texas is $2,159 
(see Figure 9 below). 
 
Figure 9 
Cost of Attendance Gap 
 
Northwestern University (Private)221 
 Cost of 
Attendance 
Full Grant  
in Aid 
 
Tuition & Fees $47,286 $47, 286  
Room & Board $14,389 $14,389  
Books & Supplies $1,914 $1,914  
Personal Expenses $1,965 Not Included  
Transportation Varies Not Included  
Total $65,554 $63,589 Δ: $1,965 
 
University of Texas (Austin, TX): In-State Tuition222 
 Cost of 
Attendance 
Full Grant  
in Aid 
 
Tuition & Fees $5,369 $5,369  
Room & Board $5,681 $5,681  
Books & Supplies $375 $375  
Personal Expenses $1,388 Not Included  
Transportation $735 Not Included  
Total $13,584 $11,425 Δ: $2,159 
 
To manage this gap and provide the full cost of attendance to 
student-athletes, member institutions will need to provide additional 
funding for travel and personal expenses, and increase the amount of 
scholarships currently provided to student-athletes.  This cost will vary 
from program to program based on the number of athletic scholarships each 
athletic program currently offers, the cost of tuition and fees, room and 
                                                          
220.  Cost of Attendance, supra note 218.   
 
221.  Id. 
 
222.  Cost of Attendance, THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, 
http://finaid.utexas.edu/costs.html (July 27, 2014). 
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board, and required course materials at each institution, and the full 
estimated cost of attendance established to attend those institutions.  
Additionally, to remain in compliance with Title IX,223 if an educational 
institution increases the amount of aid available to male athletes (i.e. 
football players) up the full cost of attendance, a proportional amount of aid 
must also be provided to female athletes.224  Therefore, increasing football 
or men’s basketball scholarships up to or beyond the cost of attendance will 
increase the cost to sponsor other sports within athletics program as well. 
The additional costs of increasing scholarships can be estimated by 
multiplying the number of athletic scholarships currently provided by the 
additional cost to increase full grant-in-aids to the full cost of attendance.  
For example, if an athletics program elected to increase approximately 100 
scholarships (eighty-five for football and thirteen for men’s basketball),225 
by $1,000 to meet the university’s full cost of attendance, the athletic 
department might incur $100,000 (100 x $1,000) of additional costs.  
However, to remain in compliance with Title IX, increasing scholarships 
for male student-athletes may also require a boost in scholarships allocated 
to female student-athletes.226  Therefore, the athletic program may need to 
actually increase almost 200 athletic scholarships up to the cost of 
attendance as opposed to the initial 100 in order to provide additional aid to 
both male and female athletes.  Thus, the athletic program might more 
accurately incur $200,000 (200 x $1000) of additional costs, significantly 
increasing grant-in-aid expenses. 
As stated above, the cost to increase athletic aid up to the cost of 
attendance will vary at each institution depending on the number of 
scholarships increased and how much value must be added to each.  Figure 
10 takes both of these factors into account to illustrate the potential costs of 
providing an actual full-ride athletic scholarship. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
223.  20 U.S.C. § 1681-87 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2010). 
224.  34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2010).  
225.  As per NCAA rules, FBS athletics programs may only furnish a maximum of eighty-
five scholarships to football, thirteen to men’s basketball, and fifteen to women’s basketball. 
2013-2014 NCAA Division I Manual art. 15.5.5, 15.5.6.  
 
226.    34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2010). 
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Figure 10 
Cost of Increasing Scholarships (Full Grant in Aid) 
Up to the Cost of Attendance 
 
 
Additional Value Added to 
Each Scholarship 
# of Scholarships $1,000 $1,500 $2,000 
50 $50,000 $75,000 $100,000 
100 $100,000 $150,000 $200,000 
150 $150,000 $225,000 $300,000 
200 $200,000 $300,000 $400,000 
250 $250,000 $375,000 $500,000 
300 $300,000 $450,000 $600,000 
 
 
 
Additional Value Added to 
Each Scholarship 
# of Scholarships $2,500 $3,000 $3,500 
50 $125,000 $150,000 $175,000 
100 $250,000 $300,000 $350,000 
150 $375,000 $450,000 $525,000 
200 $500,000 $600,000 $700,000 
250 $625,000 $750,000 $875,000 
300 $750,000 $900,000 $1,050,000 
 
C. Increasing Athletic Aid Beyond Cost of Attendance 
Increasing financial aid for student athletes up to the cost of 
attendance is just one of the many possibilities that could arise from efforts 
to reform college athletics.227  Some believe that NCAA student athletes in 
                                                          
227.  Glenn Wong, Opinion, College Athletes Should Be Careful What They Wish For, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/27/scholars-
players-and-union-members/college-athletes-should-be-careful-what-they-wish-for. 
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revenue generating sports should actually be paid much more than the cost 
of attendance, pointing to the millions of dollars in revenue that athletic 
departments generate each year.228  Others have proposed that student 
athletes should receive a flat stipend to cover personal expenses and other 
foreseeable costs.229  Regardless, either outcome will increase costs for 
athletics programs.230  If student athletes are one day paid based on which 
sports generate revenue for the university, football and men’s basketball 
teams are the most likely to receive a pay day as the two highest revenue-
generating sports, which likely opens up the door to more gender equity 
issues under Title IX.231  Although, theoretically it is unclear whether 
revenue based compensation would apply to entire teams or individual 
players.  Additionally, a flat stipend could be provided to all student 
athletes within a program, to specific sports or teams, or to specific 
athletes.232  Irrespective of how it happens or why, if athletic aid for student 
athletes is increased beyond the cost of attendance, the costs of sponsoring 
intercollegiate athletics will soar.233  Athletic aid could be increased for 
specific individuals, teams (i.e. football), sports (i.e men’s and women’s 
basketball), or for entire programs (men’s and women’s).234  Therefore, as 
illustrated in Figure 11, the additional cost of increasing athletic aid will 
depend on the value of the stipend or payment and the number of student 
athletes receiving it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
228.  Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-
athletes.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 
229.  Id. 
 
230.  Id. 
 
231.  Id. 
 
232.  Id. 
 
233.  Mechelle Voepel, Title IX a Pay-for-Play Roadblock, ESPN (Jul. 15, 2011), 
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6769337/title-ix-seen-substantial-roadblock-pay-
play-college-athletics. 
 
234.  Nocera, supra note 228.   
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Figure 11 
Cost of Increasing Athletic Aid (Full Grant in Aid) 
Beyond the Cost of Attendance 
 
 
Additional Value Added to 
Each Scholarship 
# of Student Athletes $5,000 $6,000 $7,000 
50 $250,000 $300,000 $350,000 
100 $500,000 $600,000 $700,000 
200 $1,000,000 $1,200,000 $1,400,000 
300 $1,500,000 $1,800,000 $2,100,000 
400 $2,000,000 $2,400,000 $2,800,000 
500 $2,500,000 $3,000,000 $3,500,000 
600 $3,000,000 $3,600,000 $4,200,000 
650 $3,250,000 $3,900,000 $4,550,000 
 
 
 
Additional Value Added to 
Each Scholarship 
# of Student Athletes $8,000 $9,000 $10,000 
50 $400,000 $450,000 $500,000 
100 $800,000 $900,000 $1,000,000 
200 $1,600,000 $1,800,000 $2,000,000 
300 $2,400,000 $2,700,000 $3,000,000 
400 $3,200,000 $3,600,000 $4,000,000 
500 $4,000,000 $4,500,000 $5,000,000 
600 $4,800,000 $5,400,000 $6,000,000 
650 $5,200,000 $ 5,850,000 $6,500,000 
 
D. Title IX Impact 
Title IX also figures to play a large role in the development of new 
NCAA and athletic department policies following the conclusion of the 
current litigation.  “Perhaps no law has received more attention in the 
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sports industry, specifically within high school and collegiate sports, than 
Title IX.  Forty years after its enactment, this educational statute has truly 
reshaped the landscape of American sport.”235  Title IX’s impact on NCAA 
activity is undisputed, and could be furthered depending on the outcome of 
the Northwestern case. 
Although Title IX outlaws gender discrimination in any facet of a 
school that receives public funding, it is most commonly known for its 
impact on amateur athletics.236  According to Title IX, “No person shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated 
against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics 
offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such athletics 
separately on such basis.”237 
In order to prove compliance with Title IX, athletic departments 
are tasked with three steps.  First, they must accommodate the interests and 
abilities of both male and female student-athletes.238  To do this, a program 
must be able to pass one of three tests in place.239  The most likely test that 
a school will pass is the level of competitive opportunities available to both 
genders by comparing proportional opportunities to the student population 
demographic, while the other tests examine the department’s practice of 
program expansion relative to the underrepresented gender, and determine 
if the institution fully accommodates the abilities and interests of both 
genders.240 
Next, schools are evaluated on the financial assistance they provide 
to both male and female student athletes.241  The Office of Civil Rights 
compares the scholarship dollars being spent on both genders against the 
                                                          
235.  Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review of Forty 
Legal Developments that Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325, 325 
(2012).   
 
236.  Diane Heckman, The Glass Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involving 
Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
550, 553 (2003). 
 
237.  34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2010). 
 
238.  34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2010); GLENN M. WONG, ESSENTIALS OF SPORTS LAW 
324 (4th ed. 2010). 
 
239.  WONG, supra note 238, at 324. 
 
240.  Id. 
 
241.  Id. 
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proportion of student athletes of each gender to determine if an institution 
is treating both genders equally.242  If the proportion of financial assistance 
is not equal to those that compete in athletics, then a further review is 
required.243  At times, nondiscriminatory factors, including the varying 
costs of different sports, as well as different values of instate versus out-of-
state tuitions can help to explain disparities.244 
Finally, institutions are assessed on the level to which they provide 
student athletes of both genders with equivalent benefits, opportunities, and 
treatment.245  The OCR has eleven components that are used to determine if 
equal treatment is being provided, including the athletic facilities for each 
sport, coaching staff, and equipment provided.246 
With the potential for significant reforms within both the NCAA 
and athletic department policies regarding student athletes, Title IX could 
have significant financial implications for athletic departments.247  Thus, if 
Northwestern is forced to recognize football student-athletes as a 
bargaining unit, then it may only be a matter of time until all other NCAA 
student-athletes obtain the same status. 
If the outcome of the Northwestern litigation results in NCAA 
football players receiving additional compensation of some form, schools 
will need to act to appropriately compensate their female student-athletes in 
order to maintain equality across genders.248  Regardless of whether the 
additional compensation comes in the form of increasing athletic 
scholarships to cover the full “cost of attendance” at a university, or other 
indirect benefits received through participation in an athletic program, 
athletic departments must take action to fairly compensate athletes from all 
programs in order to prove Title IX compliance.249  With very few specific 
sport programs, men’s or women’s, being profitable beyond certain high-
level football and men’s basketball programs, factoring in additional costs 
                                                          
242.  Id. at 324-325. 
 
243.  34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2010). 
 
244.  WONG, supra note 238, at 325. 
 
245.  Id. 
 
246.  34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c); WONG, supra note 238, at 325. 
 
247.  Wong, supra note 227. 
 
248.  Id.  
 
249.  Id. 
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to every athletic department for female student athletes in order to remain 
compliant with Title IX could prove particularly costly.250 
Additionally, if athletes in high profile sports like football and 
men’s basketball are granted the rights to profit off their own name, image 
and likeness, then the issues arise regarding how to deal with other men’s 
sports, as well as women’s sports.  If each student-athlete is given the rights 
to his or her own name, image and likeness, then the market will determine 
how much money they receive.  The payment will come from third parties, 
and as a result, will not fall under the purview of Title IX.251 
The final legal issue will be whether men’s football and basketball 
players, if they are employees, are subject to Title IX.  If not, then this may 
have the impact of helping men’s non-revenue sports. 
E. Workers’ Compensation Impact 
Workers’ compensation is a system of insurance that provides 
benefits to employees that are injured or become ill on the job.252  Workers’ 
compensation generally provides employees with medical care, 
compensation (total or partial), disability compensation (total or partial) 
and death benefits in the case of an injury or illness suffered because of 
their work.253 
If student-athletes are determined by a state workers’ compensation 
board to be employees of an educational institution, then the value of their 
scholarships may also be determined to constitute a salary.254  In this case, 
educational institutions, as employers, may be required to provide workers’ 
compensation benefits for student-athletes that are injured while 
                                                          
250.  Voepel, supra note 233. 
 
251.  James K. Gentry & Raquel M. Alexander, Pay for Women’s Basketball Coaches 
Lags Far Behind That of Men’s Coaches, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/sports/ncaabasketball/pay-for-womens-basketball-coaches-
lags-far-behind-mens-coaches.html?pagewanted=all. 
 
252.  UTAH LABOR COMMISSION: INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS DIVISION’S EMPLOYEE’S 
GUIDE TO WORKER’S COMPENSATION 2012/2013 (2012), available at 
http://laborcommission.utah.gov/media/pdfs/industrialaccidents/pubs/EEGuide.pdf. [hereinafter 
Utah Worker’s Compensation Guide 2012-13) 
 
253.  Id. 
 
254.  Workers’ compensation programs are administered on a state-by-state basis. New 
Hampshire Workers Compensation Pamphlet, NHBAR.ORG (Mar. 2011), 
https://www.nhbar.org/uploads/pdf/WorkersCompensationPamphlet.pdf.  Thus, student-athletes 
in some states may be considered by workers’ compensation boards to be employees of their 
institution, while other student-athletes in different states may not be afforded the same status. 
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participating in athletic competitions or training, unless the student-athletes 
are excluded from coverage.255 
In order to be able to provide these benefits, athletic departments 
must allocate funds from their operating budgets in order to pay the 
insurance premiums.  Alternatively, some states allow employers to self-
insure the cost of workers’ compensation.256  Premiums for workers’ 
compensation are calculated by multiplying the total payroll amount by the 
applicable workers’ compensation classification rate.257  For example, an 
employer with a $100,000 payroll facing a .1631 classification rate for 
classification will pay $16,310 in premiums ($100,000 x .1631 = 
$16,310).258 
Workers’ compensation is administered on a state-by-state basis; 
therefore the additional costs of providing workers’ compensation for each 
institution will vary depending on the rate used by each state.  Some states, 
such as Florida, prohibit professional athletes from being covered under 
workers’ compensation laws.259 
As the value of an athletic scholarship may be considered a 
student-athlete’s salary, the payroll of a particular institution will be the 
total value of the athletic scholarships it grants.  For each institution, the 
additional cost per athlete to provide workers’ compensation can be 
estimated by multiplying the value of an athletic scholarship by the 
appropriate workers’ compensation rate.  To calculate the total cost of 
workers’ compensation insurance at each institution, the previous figure 
can be multiplied by the number of current athletic scholarships provided, 
as shown in Figure 12 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
255.  Wong, supra note 227.   
 
256.  Utah Worker’s Compensation Guide 2012-13, supra note 252.   
 
257.  Premium Calculation, WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND, 
https://www.wcfgroup.com/premium-calculation (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
 
258.  The .1631 figure is based on an illustrative example used by the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah in demonstrating how workers’ compensation premiums are 
calculated (the actual example figure is .1641). It does not represent the actual classification rate 
used to calculate workers’ compensation premiums for the University of Utah. It is used here to 
illustrate the potential financial cost to an institution of beginning to pay such premiums.  Id. 
 
259.  Fla. Stat.  § 440.02(17)(c)3 (2013). 
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Figure 12 
Additional Cost of Providing 
Workers’ Compensation Insurance 
 
(Scholarship Value x WC Rate) x Number of Scholarships = Cost 
# of Additional 
Scholarships 
$30,000 x 
(.1631) 
$40,000 x 
(.1631) 
$50,000 x 
(.1631) 
$60,000 x 
(.1631) 
$70,000 
x (.1631) 
50 $244,650 $326,200 $407,750 $489,300 $570,850 
100 $489,300 $652,400 $815,500 $978,600 $1,141,700 
150 $733,950 $978,600 $1,223,250 $1,467,900 $1,712,550 
200 $978,600 $1,304,800 $1,631,000 $1,957,200 $2,283,400 
250 $1,223,250 $1,631,000 $2,038,750 $2,446,500 $2,854,250 
300 $1,467,900 $1,957,200 $2,446,500 $2,935,800 $3,425,100 
 
Assume that the University of Utah currently provides fifty athletic 
scholarships valued at $50,000 each.  Each student-athlete receiving a 
scholarship will effectively have a salary of $50,000.  If the Utah workers’ 
compensation rate is .1631, each scholarship will cost the institution an 
additional $8,155 ($50,000 x .1631) in premiums per year.  Therefore, the 
yearly total cost to the institution for workers’ compensation premiums for 
all fifty scholarships would be $407,750. 
In practice, calculating workers’ compensation costs will be much 
more complicated.  This is because the value of a scholarship may vary 
across sports.  It will also vary from student-athlete to student-athlete, as 
the value of an in-state scholarship at a public institution is generally less 
than the value of an out-of-state scholarship.260 
F.  Unemployment Insurance Impact 
Unemployment insurance is designed to provide financial 
protection for certain employees.261  As set forth by the state of New York 
in the preface of the “Employer’s Guide to Unemployment Insurance,” 
                                                          
260.  Ron Lieber, Pay for College:  Services Emerge to Help Out-of-State Students Pay 
In-State Tuition, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/05/your-
money/paying-for-college/chasing-in-state-tuition-as-colleges-tighten-rules.html?_r=0. 
 
261.  Employer’s Guide to Unemployment Insurance, Wage Reporting, and Tax 
Withholding Tax, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE (Jan. 2014), 
available at http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/publications/withholding/nys50.pdf. [hereinafter New 
York Employer’s Guide]. 
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“The New York State Unemployment Insurance Program, administered by 
the State Labor Department and financed by employers, provides 
immediate, short-term financial protection for people who are out of work 
through no fault of their own.”262 
Unemployment insurance is determined on a state-by-state basis.263  
Therefore, the rules, regulations and interpretations will vary.  If student-
athletes are determined to be employees of an educational institution, the 
institution may be responsible for the cost of unemployment insurance. 
This issue will be handled on a state-by-state basis to determine if 
student-athletes are employees for purposes of unemployment insurance.  
In New York, for example, the definition of a covered employee is, “any 
service, unless specifically excluded, performed for compensation under a 
contract of hire.”264 
There are a number of exclusions from unemployment insurance 
coverage in New York265 and again, these exclusions will vary by state.266 
If student-athletes found to be employees under the state’s 
unemployment insurance laws are not excluded, then unemployment 
insurance must be purchased by the employer (university athletic program).  
Most state programs consider a number of factors in determining the 
unemployment insurance rate.  For example, in New York, factors include 
the number of employees, their annual wage base, and a rate (which is the 
percentage amount paid by the employer for the insurance).267  The rate 
can/will also be adjusted based on the experience rating (once that is 
established through time and experience).268 
 
 
 
                                                          
262.  Id. 
 
263.  State Unemployment Insurance Benefits, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMINISTRATION, 
http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
 
264.  New York Employer’s Guide, supra note 261. 
 
265.  Employers are not responsible for unemployment insurance contributions for, among 
others: independent contractors, students, sole proprietors, free-lance reporters, licensed real 
estate brokers, licensed insurance agents.  Id. 
 
266.  Id. 
 
267.  Id. 
 
268.  Id. 
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Figure 13 
Additional Cost of Providing Unemployment Insurance 
 
 
Number of 
Student-
Athletes 
Annual Wages 
(assume $70,000 
per student-
athlete) 
 
1% rate 
 
8% rate 
100 $7,000,000 $70,000 $560,000 
150 $10,500,000 $105,000 $840,000 
200 $14,000,000 $140,000 $1,120,000 
250 $17,500,000 $175,000 $1,400,000 
300 $21,000,000 $210,000 $1,680,000 
 
New York’s normal range rates are 0 to 8 percent.269 So in the 
figure above, if 200 student-athletes are considered employees and covered 
under state statutes for unemployment benefits, then the cost to the 
employer will be $140,000 to $1,120,000 based on the rate.  It is important 
to note that the rate can be adjusted by a subsidiary rate and an experience 
rating.270 
If student-athletes are determined to be employees and are not 
excluded from unemployment insurance, as Figure 13 shows, the costs may 
vary considerably based on the number of student-athletes, their annual 
wage and the rate.  There will be some added cost, and especially with high 
rates, these costs are not insignificant. 
G.  Income Tax Impact 
As discussed earlier, it is unlikely that unionization would lead to 
taxable “employee” college athletes.  However, in a new world of college 
athletics, the Internal Revenue Service may change its stance.  So for now, 
while in the “unlikely” category, here are the federal income tax 
implications if a college athlete’s scholarship is considered a wage or 
salary. 
If the value of an athletic scholarship is considered a wage or 
salary, student-athletes may be required to pay income tax based upon the 
value of the scholarship271  If colleges and universities aim to ensure that 
                                                          
269.  Id. 
 
270.  New York Employer’s Guide, supra note 261. 
 
271.  Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 755-58 (1969) (grants given to taxpayers by their 
employer so that they could research and write their doctoral theses in engineering were taxable 
‘compensation’, rather than excludable ‘scholarships', where there was an employer-employee 
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student-athletes are made whole and that athletic scholarships cover 
relevant costs, then the cost of income tax will need to be included when 
determining the value of a scholarship. 
For example, X University provides 100 scholarships valued at 
$50,000 each.  For illustrative purposes, assume that the tax on $50,000 of 
income is $8,000 dollars.  Also assume that the tax on $60,000 of income is 
$10,000.  If each student-athlete is required to pay income tax on the value 
of his or her scholarship, then each scholarship would only be worth 
$42,000 ($50,000- $8,000(tax)).  This additional cost may mean that the 
scholarship no longer covers the cost of tuition & fees, room & board, and 
required course materials.  Therefore, in order to offset the decrease in 
scholarship value caused by the introduction of an income tax, X 
University will need to increase the amount of a scholarship to $60,000.  
This will ensure that the after-tax value of each scholarship remains at 
$50,000 ($60,000-$10,000).  Adjusting the value of a scholarship to 
account for income tax paid by student-athletes will cost the university 
$10,000 per scholarship, which in a department with 100 scholarships, will 
cost a total of $1,000,000 per year ($10,000 x 100 scholarships). 
 
V. CHANGES TO THE NCAA MODEL 
Based on the above analysis, a median-level athletic department 
will face a financial impact in the $3M to $5M range if student-athletes are 
treated as employees.  Of course, a settlement in the Northwestern case 
means that the financial impact could fall within a much greater range, 
perhaps anywhere from $0 to $5M.  The question then becomes, if the 
expense side of the athletic department’s budget faces an increase, how will 
this be accounted for?  Can FBS athletic departments afford these 
additional costs, and if so, how will they be covered? 
The reality is that a total of twenty (of 123) FBS athletics programs 
reported positive net generated revenues (generated revenues exceed 
expenses) in 2013.272  On the contrary, a total of 103 FBS athletics 
programs reported negative net generated revenues (expenses exceeded 
                                                          
relationship, employee benefits were continued, topics of theses were required to relate at least 
generally to work of laboratory where taxpayers were employed, and employer required taxpayers 
not only to hold positions with employer throughout the ‘work-study’ phase of the program, but 
taxpayers were also obligated to return to employer for two years after completion of their leave). 
 
272.  Daniel L. Fulks, Revenues and Expenses: NCAA Division I Intercollegiate Athletics 
Programs Report 2004-2013, NCAA 13 (Apr. 2014), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D1REVEXP2013.pdf. 
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generated revenue) in 2013.273 
For those institutions that reported positive net generated revenues, 
the median net generated revenue was $8,449,000.274  For those institutions 
where expenses exceeded revenues, the median net deficit was 
$14,904,000.275  Thus, the financial gap between successful programs and 
those with a deficit was just over $23,000,000.276  However, for those 103 
programs that reported negative net generated revenue, losses only 
increased 2% over 2012,277 after increasing almost 21% the previous 
year.278 
It is important to recognize that the potential additional costs 
discussed above (Title IX, unemployment insurance, workers’ 
compensation, income taxes) will increase the expense side of the financial 
statements for each FBS institution. 
The budget sizes of FBS athletic departments vary tremendously.  
For example, in 2013, the University of Texas reported total expenses of 
$146,807,585, while Arizona State reported total expenses of $65,600,187, 
and Ohio University with reported total expenses of $27,027,550.279 
Grants-in-aid represent a significant percentage of athletic department 
expenses.280  In 2013, the median total grant-in-aid expenses for FBS 
programs was $8,088,000 for public institutions and $14,014,000 for 
private schools.281 
Very few institutions with positive net revenues may be able to 
afford the additional costs discussed above.  This is especially true of 
universities and athletic departments that are self-sufficient.  There are 
currently seven collegiate athletic programs (Texas, Ohio State, LSU, Penn 
State, Oklahoma, Nebraska, & Purdue) that are self-sufficient, meaning that 
                                                          
273.  Id. at 28. 
 
274.  Id. at 13. 
 
275.  Id.  
 
276.  Id.  
 
277.  Id. at 12. 
 
278.  Fulks, supra note 272, at 28. 
 
279.  NCAA Finances, USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/schools/finances/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). 
 
280.  Fulks, supra note 272 at 32. 
 
281.  Id. 
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the departments are not dependent upon institutional entities outside the 
athletic department but most schools account for allocated expenses. 282 
Beyond the twenty programs in the Power Five conferences that 
reported a positive net generated revenue in 2013, the remaining 100 or so 
FBS institutions will face significant financial challenges likely to have a 
substantial impact on their athletic department revenues.  This group of 
institutions includes most of the forty-five remaining schools from the 
Power Five conferences.283  For example, the Rutgers University athletic 
department received nearly $47 million in institutional funds during the 
2012-13 academic year, an increase of 67.9% from the previous year.284  
The University of Tennessee received an institutional subsidy of over $12.4 
million in 2012-13.285  However, it is important to note that the significant 
increase in revenues is already in place for schools in the Power Five 
conferences.286  This includes television contracts and revenues from the 
College Football playoff system.287  The schools in the Power Five 
conferences should clearly be able to afford significant increased benefits 
to student-athletes (and this is without reducing the expense side of 
significant coaching salaries for coaches and staff, as well as significant 
facilities investments).288 
It is clear that the next category, the non-Power Five conference 
institutions might face significant and severe challenges.  These schools 
already rely upon a very high percentage of institutional funding (allocated 
                                                          
282.  NCAA Finances, supra note 278 (indicated as schools that receive zero subsidy). 
 
283.  See Dennis Dodd, NCAA Proposal Would Put Power in Hands of BCS Conferences, 
CBS SPORTS (Jan. 10, 2014, 12:42 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/dennis-
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284.  Keith Sargeant & Steve Berkoitz, Subsidy of Rutgers Athletics Jumps 67.9% to $47 
Million, USA TODAY (Feb. 23, 2014, 10:32 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/02/23/rutgers-university-athletics-subsidy-
jumps/5761371/. 
 
285.  NCAA Finances, supra note 279. 
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revenues).289  Institutional funds represent 41.81% of the athletic 
department revenues at East Carolina University, 66.24% at Ohio 
University, and 65.92% at Troy University (contrast this with the 
University of Michigan, an FBS institution that reported positive net 
generated revenue and a 0.18% institutional subsidy).290  Schools in this 
category have already been trying to reduce institutional allocations, so 
there is very little possibility of increasing revenue streams sufficiently in 
order to cover increased costs.291  However, the institutions in this category 
have the opportunity and ability to reduce coaching salaries or expenditures 
relating to training facilities.  This likely means a request for more 
institutional funding, which given financial challenges in higher education 
in general, will be difficult at best and probably unlikely.  Some FBS 
institutions rely very little on allocated revenue.  For example, allocated 
revenue accounts for just 0.18% of Michigan’s total athletic department 
revenue.292  Other institutions depend more heavily upon allocated 
revenues in order to compete.  Allocated revenue comprises 66.24% of the 
total athletic department revenues at Ohio University.293 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
College athletics may now find itself at a crossroads similar to that 
faced by professional athletics roughly a half century ago.  As the 
foregoing analysis makes clear, the long-term legal and economic 
implications for the existing model of college athletics remain hotly 
contested.  There are compelling reasons to believe that the Board’s 
decision regarding the eligibility of scholarship athletes to form a union 
should and would have little direct impact on the viability of athletic 
programs—both because certain sensitive issues, such as education, could 
simply be classified as non-mandatory bargaining subjects; and because the 
link between a determination of employee status under labor law and under 
other areas of the law, such as taxation, is tenuous at best.  At the same 
time, the numbers suggests that a worst-case scenario resulting in new 
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taxation and increased employment costs for universities could indeed have 
substantial financial implications for the least-profitable programs—even if 
the doomsday prophecies put forward by some anti-union commentators 
would likely not come to pass.  Despite this uncertainty, a number of key 
points are readily discernable. 
First, it is apparent that the demarcation line between 
“professional” and “amateur” athletics has become increasingly synthetic, 
and that what used to be a true “student-athlete” system in decades past has 
become a big business with close ties to the professional leagues.  Second, 
as a result of this commercialization of college sports, it is also apparent 
that there is a great deal of money to go around at the college level—even 
if the lion’s share of the profits now flow to the largest and most successful 
programs and their coaches.  Third, with this backdrop in mind, it is 
difficult to dispute the fundamental accuracy of the Regional Director’s 
determination in the Northwestern case regarding the employee-like control 
and payment of scholarship athletes. 
However, these observations do not resolve the difficult questions 
surrounding college athletics, but merely open the door to further 
complexities.  As a matter of both labor law and social policy, the Regional 
Director’s decision in Northwestern points in the right direction.  Athletes 
have no, or a very small, constituency—even a smaller one than their more 
nakedly professional counterparts.294  And it is unclear to what extent 
political considerations, and the substantial vested interests of policymakers 
and sports fans alike, will interfere with the necessary reforms in college 
sports and perhaps with the Board’s review of the Northwestern decision 
itself as well as a pushback potential from both the Supreme Court295 and 
congress.296 Furthermore, the entrenched symbiotic relationship between 
the professional leagues and the “amateur” system suggests that there are 
                                                          
294.  Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, O’Bannon v. NCAA, no. 09-cv-03329-
CW at 31 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (“many people felt that the removal of the reserve clause . . . 
which ultimately enabled players to become free agents, thus leading to higher salaries – would 
undermine the popularity of professional baseball.  However, despite these predictions and  fans’ 
stated opposition to rising salaries, Major League Baseball revenues continued to rise after the 
removal of the reserve clause quote regarding opinion survey . . . would undermine the popularity 
of professional ball.”).  cf. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, BARGAINING WITH BASEBALL: LABOR 
RELATIONS IN AN AGE OF PROSPEROUS TURMOIL (2011). 
 
295.  See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).  For recent demonstrations of a 
fundamentally conservative Court, see William B. Gould IV, The Supreme Court, Job 
Discrimination, Affirmative Action, Globalization, and Class Actions:  Justice Ginsburg’s Term, 
36 U. HAW. L. REV. 371 (2014); cf. Quinn v. Harris, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014). 
 
296.  See Big Labor on College Campuses: Examining the Consequences of Unionizing 
Student Athletes, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 
FULL COURT PRESS (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2015  1:53 PM 
2014] FULL COURT PRESS 61 
few practicable alternatives on the horizon, and little motivation to 
dramatically restructure the basic framework that currently exists. 
Unionization at the college level could have a dramatic impact, 
although instead of athlete compensation, the true focus of bargaining may 
turn out to be player concerns that are developing at the professional level 
as well, such as safety, concussions,297 and the abuse of painkillers.298  The 
election at Northwestern may not be the ultimate catalyst for major changes 
to the existing collegiate system, but regardless of its ultimate resolution, it 
demonstrates the increasing pressures that are building to effectuate some 
type of long-term reform. 
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